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WHEN “TESTING THE WATERS” TESTS THE
LIMITS OF COORDINATION RESTRICTIONS:
REVISING FEC REGULATIONS TO LIMIT
PRE-CANDIDACY COORDINATION
Marc E. Klepner*
During the preliminary stages of the 2016 presidential election, many
prospective candidates took an active role in the Super PACs that would
eventually support them after they became candidates. The regulatory
system in place provides clear restrictions on Super PACs’ abilities to
coordinate with candidates; however, what is less clear is whether such
regulations restrict the behavior of individuals during pre-candidacy,
known under Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations as the
“testing-the-waters” phase. This Note gives an overview of the laws and
regulations governing Super PACs, as well as the regulations and FEC
guidance concerning when an individual becomes a candidate. This Note
then examines the lawfulness of noncandidate coordination with Super
PACs through an analysis of FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09. Lastly, this
Note advocates for further regulation and proposes several new regulations
that should be adopted by the FEC to restrict this type of precandidacy
conduct.
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INTRODUCTION
“Should I choose to be a candidate . . . [m]y lawyers love that, when I
say, we’re exploring a campaign, should we choose to run [for President],”
joked Governor Scott Walker while speaking to a crowd at the Conservative
Political Action Conference in late February of 2015.1 Although Governor
Walker did not announce his candidacy until July 13, 2015,2 during the
preceding eight months, Governor Walker surely looked like a candidate,
traveling the country courting major donors and party leadership,3 giving

1. Governor Scott Walker Remarks at CPAC (C-SPAN television broadcast Feb. 26,
2015), http://www.c-span.org/video/?324557-12/governor-scott-walker-remarks-cpac [https:
//perma.cc/J4MH-692M].
2. See Samantha Lachman, Scott Walker Announces He’s Running for President in
2016, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015, 7:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/07/13/scott-walker-2016-_n_6186362.html [https://perma.cc/828D-84Y9].
3. See Peter Hamby, Scott Walker Backs Pathway to Citizenship at Private Dinner,
CNN (Mar. 27, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/26/politics/election-2016scott-walker-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/G2VS-UE4X]; John McCormick, Scott Walker
Courting Mitt Romney Donors After Slamming Candidate Romney, BLOOMBERG (June 10,
2015, 4:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-06-10/walker-courtingromney-donors-after-slamming-candidate-romney [https://perma.cc/V8AY-BKBL].
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speeches in key primary states,4 and even setting up an office in Iowa as
early as February 2015.5 However, instead of stating the obvious and
announcing his candidacy, much to his lawyers’ satisfaction, Governor
Walker consistently maintained that he was simply “exploring” a run for the
Presidency,6 or as it is called under Federal Election Commission (FEC)
All the while, the independent
regulations, “testing the waters.”7
expenditure-only political action committee—commonly known as a Super
PAC8—supporting Governor Walker raised over twenty million dollars by
the end of June 2015.9
As Governor Walker not so subtly alluded by referencing his lawyers,
this delay in officially declaring candidacy was no accident; rather, it was a
calculated strategy. Unlike candidates and other PACs, Super PACs can
raise unlimited funds from individuals, corporations, and labor unions and
spend unlimited amounts in support of candidates.10 On the other hand,
Super PACs are restricted from coordinating with the candidates they
support.11 However, whether these coordination regulations apply to
individuals before they officially become candidates is unclear.12 Thus,
Governor Walker’s lawyers “love” when he avoids calling himself a
candidate because, by purporting not to be a candidate, he can exploit the
testing-the-waters phase to circumvent campaign finance restrictions that
are triggered when an individual becomes a candidate.
Governor Walker is not alone in utilizing this creative pre-candidacy
strategy. During the preliminary stages of the 2016 presidential election,
many prospective candidates pushed the boundaries of campaign finance
laws. Instead of using this pre-candidacy period to determine if candidacy
is viable,13 these prospective candidates exploited the testing-the-waters
phase to prepare for candidacy without the burden of coordination
restrictions. Such preparation took many forms. Several prospective
candidates played an active role in the formation of a single-candidate
4. See John DiStaso, New Hampshire Primary Source: Is Scott Walker Serious About
New Hampshire?, WMUR9 (July 16, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.wmur.com/politics/newhampshire-primary-source-is-scott-walker-serious-about-new-hampshire/34188724
[https://perma.cc/6RM9-TL8N]; Andrew Shain, 2016 in SC: Scott Walker Visiting Four
Cities This Month, STATE (Mar. 2, 2015, 5:32 PM), http://www.thestate.com/news/politicsgovernment/politics-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article13741355.html [https://perma.cc/6MMC
-7XR7].
5. Jennifer Jacobs, First 2016 Presidential Hopeful to Open an Iowa Office: Scott
Walker, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:36 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2015/02/10/scott-walker-first-to-open-iowa-officeamong-white-house-hopefuls/23173785/ [https://perma.cc/W84T-LAMD].
6. See Governor Scott Walker Remarks at CPAC, supra note 1.
7. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644 (2012).
9. See FEC Form 3X, Report of Receipts and Disbursements, Unintimidated PAC Inc.,
at 3 (July 31, 2015), http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/010/201507319000485010/201507319
000485010.pdf [https://perma.cc/86XT-JTLG].
10. See infra Part I.B.1.
11. See infra Part I.B.2.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra note 80.
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Super PAC—a Super PAC that only supports one candidate—whose
purpose was to support that individual during candidacy. This active
involvement included appointing that Super PAC’s leadership, where such
prospective candidates often placed close advisors and former aides at the
helm.14 Several candidates reportedly also shared their plans and strategies
for candidacy with that Super PAC, developing their campaign platform in
conjunction with the Super PAC’s leadership.15 Lastly, and perhaps most
commonly, many Super PACs filmed footage of prospective candidates
during the pre-candidacy phase and subsequently used that footage to create
advertisements supporting the candidates after they officially declared.16
All of these actions would almost certainly be unlawful coordination had
the individuals engaged in the conduct while they were officially
candidates.17
The rise of this testing-the-waters circumvention strategy was well
documented by the media,18 and many accused these prospective candidates
of violating campaign finance law;19 but is this sort of pre-candidacy
conduct illegal? On September 15, 2015, campaign finance lawyer Marc
Elias, on behalf of House Majority PAC and Senate Majority PAC—two
Democratic PACs—posed several questions to the FEC in an advisory
opinion20 request concerning the legality of this conduct.21 In his request,
Elias asked for clarification on whether testing-the-waters candidates are
subject to existing coordination regulations and whether such conduct in
and of itself triggers candidacy.22 Despite the seemingly obvious need for
guidance, the FEC promulgated Advisory Opinion 2015-0923 in response to
Elias’ request, but failed to obtain the required majority and left these
questions unanswered.24
Part I of this Note examines the origin of Super PACs, discusses the
regulations controlling Super PACs, and analyzes the relevant regulations
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.B.2.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See PAUL S. RYAN, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., “TESTING THE WATERS” AND THE BIG
LIE: HOW PROSPECTIVE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES EVADE CANDIDATE CONTRIBUTION
LIMITS
WHILE
THE
FEC
LOOKS
THE
OTHER
WAY
8–29
(2015),
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/Testing_the_Waters_and_the_Big_Li
e_2.19.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL4R-EFR7]; infra note 149 and accompanying text.
20. An advisory opinion is the mechanism by which a requestor can ask the FEC to
comment on certain specific proposed activities before engaging in said activities. See 2
U.S.C. § 437f (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30108 (West 2015)); infra Part II.B.3.
An advisory opinion is compared with a matter under review, which is the mechanism by
which the FEC administers its enforcement powers, determining whether an individual or
group violated campaign finance law. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A.
§ 30108).
21. See infra Part II.B.1.
22. See infra Part II.B.1.
23. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09 (Senate Majority PAC and House Majority PAC)
(Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter AO 2015-09], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2015-09.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8K62-4QJM].
24. See infra Part II.B.3.
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and FEC guidance governing when a testing-the-waters candidate becomes
a candidate. Part II first gives an overview of the ways in which certain
individuals—then prospective candidates, later official candidates—pushed
the boundaries of permissible testing-the-waters conduct during preliminary
stages of the 2016 presidential election. Part II then analyzes the legality of
such testing-the-waters candidates’ involvement with Super PACs through
the lens of Advisory Opinion 2015-09. Lastly, Part II examines the effects
of the deadlocked Advisory Opinion 2015-09. Part III discusses whether
further regulation should be adopted. Finally, Part IV argues that such
regulation is necessary and proposes several new regulations.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SUPER PACS AND BECOMING A CANDIDATE
Before discussing the legality of noncandidates’ coordination with Super
PACs, it is first important to understand how Super PACs came to be, how
they function, and the regulations governing when an individual becomes a
candidate. Part I.A gives an overview of Super PACs, focusing on the
Supreme Court holdings that led to their emergence. Part I.B then discusses
the current laws and regulations governing Super PACs. Finally, Part I.C
explores the regulations and FEC guidance regarding how an individual
becomes a candidate.
A. The Origin of Super PACs
A Super PAC is an FEC-registered political action committee that makes
only independent expenditures—that is, expenditures in support or
opposition of a candidate which are not coordinated with that candidate25—
not contributions.26 The origin of Super PACs begins with Buckley v.
Valeo,27 where the Supreme Court first made this important distinction
between independent expenditures and contributions.28 Deeply rooted in
this distinction is the tension at the heart of campaign finance regulation:
protecting the First Amendment right of free speech and preventing
corruption.29 In Buckley, the Court held that contributions, including both
direct contributions and coordinated expenditures, may be limited because
they give rise to the danger of quid pro quo corruption and the appearance
of corruption.30 Conversely, the Buckley Court, under a strict scrutiny
standard of review, struck down limits on independent expenditures.31 The
Court reasoned that such expenditures do not present this same danger of
corruption, and, thus, the restrictions were an unconstitutional burden on the
First Amendment.32
25. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(17)); Briffault, supra
note 8, at 1651.
26. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1651.
27. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
28. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1651.
29. Id.
30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.
31. Id. at 45–46, 75.
32. Id.
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Buckley laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. FEC.33 In holding corporations may make unlimited
independent expenditures,34 the Court made two important
determinations.35 First, the Court clarified the type of corruption sufficient
to justify First Amendment limitations, holding that preventing quid pro
quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption was the only
legitimate justification for campaign finance limits.36 The Court explicitly
overruled two prior cases because the decisions were, in part, based on
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
other corruption justifications37:
Commerce,38 where the Court upheld limits on corporate expenditures
because of the “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate
form,”39 later termed the “antidistortion rationale,”40 and McConnell v.
FEC,41 where the Court upheld a soft-money ban reasoning that soft-money
donations were likely to give donors preferential access to officeholders.42
The second important determination the Court made in Citizens United
was ruling that independent expenditures categorically do not give rise to
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.43 The Court reasoned
that “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate . . . not only undermines the value of the expenditure to
the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given
as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”44 By
holding that independent expenditures are impervious to corruption, the
Court laid the groundwork for independent expenditure-only committees to
emerge, as this holding opened the door for PACs to spend unlimited funds
on independent expenditures.45
Although the Citizens United Court held that independent expenditures
were incorruptible, the Court did not address one question that was
necessary to answer before the modern-day Super PAC could emerge:
33. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
34. Id. at 365.
35. Id. at 357, 359.
36. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61. The Court later reaffirmed this holding in
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (“[W]hile preventing corruption or its
appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of
corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”).
37. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–55, 360.
38. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
39. Id. at 660.
40. See Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 313.
41. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
42. Id. at 156.
43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. The Court offered the 100,000-page record in
McConnell v. FEC as evidence, stating that the lack of examples of votes being exchanged
for expenditures in McConnell “confirms Buckley’s reasoning that independent expenditures
do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.” Id. at 360.
44. Id. at 357 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)).
45. See Note, Working Together for an Independent Expenditure: Candidate Assistance
with Super Pac Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1482 (2015) [hereinafter Working
Together].
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whether limits could be placed on contributions to independent expenditureonly groups. Within just a few months of Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit
answered this question in SpeechNow.org v. FEC,46 laying the final brick
necessary for the formation of the modern-day Super PAC. Relying on the
Citizens United holding that independent expenditures are impervious to
corruption, the D.C. Circuit held that “the government can have no anticorruption interest in limiting contributions to independent expenditureonly organizations,” and, thus, any limitations on such contributions were
unconstitutional.47 Although the FEC did not appeal SpeechNow.org, nor
has the Supreme Court otherwise specifically addressed contributions to
independent expenditure-only committees, the holding in SpeechNow.org
has been widely accepted and adopted.48
B. Regulating the Modern-Day Super PAC
Super PACs are unique from other forms of PACs in both their abilities
and limitations. Part I.B.1 gives an overview of the benefits of forming a
Super PAC, as compared to other PACs. Part I.B.2 then discusses the
restrictions placed on Super PACs.
1. Why So Super?: The Inapplicable Regulations
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197149 (FECA), Super
PACs are subject to the same federal organizational, registration, reporting,
and disclosure requirements that apply to other PACs.50 However, because
Super PACs only make independent expenditures, they are not subject to
FECA’s $5000 contribution limit.51 That said, any PAC can engage in
unlimited independent spending, as non-Super PACs can make both
contributions and independent expenditures.52 However, PACs that make
contributions—that is, non-Super PACs—can only engage in unlimited
independent spending with funds raised in compliance with FECA and FEC
regulations, which prohibit non-Super PACs from raising funds from
corporations and labor organizations53 and receiving donations from
individuals in excess of $5000 a year.54 On the other hand, pursuant to
46. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
47. Id. at 696.
48. Bradley A. Smith, Super Pacs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance
Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 604 (2013); see N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh,
733 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013); Texans for Free Enter. v. Tx. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d
535, 538 (5th Cir. 2013); Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664
F.3d 139, 155 (7th Cir. 2011); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long
Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 699 (9th Cir. 2010).
49. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
50. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1646; see 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433, 434 (2012) (transferred to
52 U.S.C.A. §§ 30102, 30103, 30104 (West 2015)); 11 C.F.R. § 104.4 (2015).
51. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(2)(A)).
52. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1647.
53. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b).
54. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(1)(C)). There is
one exception to the rule that non-Super PACs can only spend funds raised within the
contribution constraints of FECA and FEC regulations, however. A Hybrid PAC, created
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Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, Super PACs can engage in unlimited
independent spending with funds raised from individuals, corporations, and
labor organizations that are not subject to contribution dollar restrictions.55
2. Restricting Super PACs:
Coordination and the Independent-Only Requirement
Although Super PACs are seemingly given wide latitude to raise and
spend funds, these independent expenditure-only committees have one
obvious limitation: they can make only independent expenditures.56 An
independent expenditure is defined as an expenditure “expressly
advocating[57] the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate[58] . . . that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the
request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s authorized political
committee, or their agents,”59 or in other words, is not coordinated with
such candidate.60 Super PACs’ existence hinges on this coordination
restriction—that is, the independence of an independent expenditure.61
The FEC promulgated a three-prong test for determining whether an
expenditure is coordinated, which consists of the payment, content, and
conduct prongs.62 The payment prong is satisfied if the communication
“[i]s paid for, in whole or in part, by a person other than that candidate,
authorized committee, or political party committee.”63 The content prong is
satisfied if the communication is one of the types of communications listed
after Carey v. FEC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2011), may raise unlimited sums from
individuals, corporations, and labor organizations for independent expenditures, like a Super
PAC, and raise funds subject to the FECA and FEC regulation limitations for contributions,
if it meets certain requirements, such as maintaining separate bank accounts. 11 C.F.R.
§ 114.10(a); Dave Levinthal, Hybrid PACs Generating Few Greenbacks, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Feb. 2, 2015, 2:07 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/02/01/16682/
hybrid-pacs-generating-few-greenbacks [https://perma.cc/94G7-7UV8].
55. See supra Part I.A.
56. Briffault, supra note 8, at 1647.
57. Express advocacy includes any communication that
[w]hen taken as a whole . . . could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as
containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified
candidate(s) because—
(1) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable,
unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and
(2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to
elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages
some other kind of action.
11 C.F.R. § 100.22. For examples of communications containing express advocacy, see id.
58. “Clearly identified” means the candidate’s name, nickname, photograph, or drawing
appears, or the identity of the candidate is otherwise apparent through an unambiguous
reference. 2 U.S.C § 431(18) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(18)); 11 C.F.R. § 100.17.
For examples of references to a clearly identified candidate, see 11 C.F.R. § 100.17.
59. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(17)); see also 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.16.
60. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a) (defining coordinated).
61. See Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38
(D.D.C. 2012); Smith, supra note 48, at 604– 05; Working Together, supra note 45, at 1483.
62. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a).
63. Id. § 109.21(a)(1).
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in the regulation.64 The conduct prong is the most relevant part of the test,
as it deals with the actual interactions between candidates and Super PACs.
The conduct prong is satisfied if: (1) the communication is created at the
request or suggestion of the candidate or at the suggestion of a person
paying for the communication and the candidate assents to the suggestion;65
(2) the candidate is materially involved in decision making for the
communication;66 (3) the communication is created after one or more
substantial discussions about the communication between the person or
organization paying for the communication and the candidate;67 (4) the
person or organization paying for the communication contracts with a
commercial vendor to produce or distribute the communication that
provided certain services to the candidate during the previous 120 days;68 or
(5) the communication is paid for by a person or by the employer of a
person who was an employee or independent contractor of the candidate
during the previous 120 days.69 The FEC specifies that neither agreement
nor formal collaboration is required for a communication to be
coordinated.70
A coordinated expenditure is treated as a contribution to the candidate.71
Thus, a Super PAC could face severe consequences if it made a coordinated
expenditure. As the Super PAC would no longer be making only
independent expenditures, it would lose its ability to operate as a Super
64. See id. § 109.21(c). These include electioneering communications, see id. § 100.29
for the definition, and certain public communications that are listed in id. § 109.21(c)(2)–(5).
65. Id. § 109.21(d)(1).
66. Id. § 109.21(d)(2). Material involvement includes playing a part in decisions
regarding the content, intended audience, means or mode, the media outlet, the timing or
frequency, the size of printed communications, or the duration of broadcast communications.
Id.
67. Id. § 109.21(d)(3). A discussion is substantial if information about the candidate’s
campaign plans, projects, activities, or needs is conveyed to the person or group paying for
the communication and that information is material to the creation, production, or
distribution of the communication. Id.
68. Id. § 109.21(d)(4). These services include developing a media strategy or the
content of the public communication; selecting audiences; polling; fundraising; producing a
public communication; identifying voters or creating voter lists, mailing lists, or donor lists;
selecting personnel, contractors, or subcontractors; and consulting or otherwise providing
political or media advice. Id.
69. Id. § 109.21(d)(5).
70. Id. § 109.21(e). Additionally, the FEC also included several safe harbor provisions:
candidates may respond to inquiries about legislative or policy issues; the person or group
paying for the communication may use publicly available information to create the
communication; candidates may endorse or solicit funds for other candidates, political
committees, or other organizations; candidates may appear in a public communication in
which he or she is clearly identified as the owner or operator of a business that existed prior
to candidacy; and none of the conduct standards are satisfied if the vendor, political
committee, former employee, or contractor implements a firewall. Id. §§ 109.21(d)(2)–(5),
(f), (g), (h). However, the firewall safe harbor does not apply if, despite the firewall, the
circumstances indicate that the person paying for the communication used or was conveyed
information about the candidate’s campaign plans, projects, activities, or needs and such
information was material to the creation, production, or distribution of that communication.
Id. § 109.21(h).
71. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(i)
(West 2015)).
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PAC,72 thus triggering the FECA contribution regulations placed on nonSuper PACs.73 Additionally, if the contribution (in this case, the
coordinated expenditure) cost more than $5000 or was paid for with funds
raised from corporations or labor unions, the contribution would be
unlawful, as it would contravene FECA’s contribution restrictions.74
C. Testing the Waters or Triggering Candidacy:
Determining When an Individual Becomes a Candidate
Before exploring how these Super PAC limits interact with testing-thewaters candidates, it is important to determine how an individual becomes a
candidate. However, the answer to this question is not as cut-and-dried as it
may seem. Part I.C.1 gives a basic overview of the laws and regulations
governing testing-the-waters candidates’ transition into candidacy. Part
I.C.2 then discusses how the FEC, through advisory opinions and matters
under review, has attempted to provide guidance on the enforcement of
these laws and regulations.
1. Statutes and Regulations
According to FECA and FEC regulations, a candidate is an individual
who, in seeking election to federal office, receives contributions or makes
expenditures—or consents to another person doing so on their behalf—
aggregating in excess of $5000.75 However, the FEC created an exemption
to this $5000 aggregate threshold for contributions and expenditures spent
“for the purpose of determining whether an individual should become a
candidate,” known as the testing-the-waters exemption.76 That said, this
exemption does not apply to payments made or received “for activities
indicating that an individual has decided to become a candidate for a
particular office or for activities relevant to conducting a campaign.”77
Once candidacy is triggered, the individual must file a statement of
candidacy with the FEC within fifteen days, and all funds or payments
exempt during the testing-the-waters phase are treated as contributions or
expenditures and must be reported.78 On the other hand, while in the
testing-the-waters phase, individuals do not have to register with the FEC,
72. Smith, supra note 48, at 605.
73. See supra Part I.B.2.
74. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text (explaining that contributions may
not be made in excess of $5000 or from funds raised from corporations or labor unions); 2
U.S.C. § 441a(f) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(f)) (“No candidate or political
committee shall knowingly accept any contribution or make any expenditure in violation of
the provisions of this section . . . .”); see also Working Together, supra note 45, at 1483
(“Because certain actors, such as corporations and labor organizations, cannot contribute
money directly to federal candidates, a Super PAC’s contribution to a candidate would be
illegal if the Super PAC had raised any of its funds from those prohibited sources.”).
75. 2 U.S.C. § 431(2) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(2)); 11 C.F.R. § 100.3.
76. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131.
77. Id.
78. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(e), 433 (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 30102(e), 30103); 11
C.F.R. §§ 101.1, 101.3, 100.72, 100.131.
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create an exploratory committee, or file disclosure reports, but may if they
so choose.79
2. FEC Clarification or Confusion?
The FEC created the testing-the-waters exemption to afford individuals
the opportunity to determine whether there is enough political support for a
candidacy.80 These regulations seek to draw a distinction between activities
directed at evaluating one’s candidacy and those merely confirming a
private decision to become a candidate that has already been made.81 An
individual, who has raised or spent more than $5000, becomes a candidate
when he or she makes a private determination to run for federal office.82
However, the FEC looks objectively at an individual’s activities in
determining whether this decision has been made, not to that individual’s
subjective decision-making process.83 This section explores how the FEC
conducts this objective analysis. Part I.C.2.a discusses how the FEC has
expanded permissible testing-the-waters activities. Part I.C.2.b analyzes
how the FEC has attempted to provide guidance on the type of conduct that
triggers candidacy.
a. Permissible Testing-the-Waters Activities
FEC regulations provide a nonexhaustive list of permissible testing-thewaters activities, which includes conducting polls, telephone calls, and
travel.84 Through advisory opinions and matters under review, the FEC has
clarified and expanded what constitutes a permissible testing-the-waters
activity.
In Advisory Opinion 1981-32, the FEC found that none of the fourteen
testing-the-waters activities proposed by the requestor, former Governor
Reubin Askew, would trigger candidacy.85 The FEC further clarified
permissible testing-the-waters “travel” by approving Askew’s plans to
travel throughout the country to speak to groups about public issues and
attend briefings, as well as employ an assistant to help coordinate these
travel arrangements.86 The FEC also clarified the conducting polls
exemption by approving Askew’s plans to employ a “specialist in opinion
research to conduct [his] polls.”87
79. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 101.3, 100.72, 100.131; FEC Matter Under Review 6819 (Krulick
for Congress), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 6 n.7 (Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter MUR 6819],
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/15044371517.pdf [https://perma.cc/89Y2-95PD].
80. FEC Advisory Opinion 1981-32 (Askew), at 4 (Oct. 2, 1981) [hereinafter AO 198132], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1981-32.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUE3-USZ5].
81. Id.
82. AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 5.
83. FEC Matter Under Review 5363 (Sharpton), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 7–8
(Nov. 13, 2003) [hereinafter MUR 5363], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/000007F9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LHB-AVRX].
84. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131.
85. AO 1981-32, supra note 80, at 4.
86. Id. at 2–3.
87. Id. at 3.
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Additionally, the FEC approved several more of Askew’s plans,
expanding permissible testing-the-waters activities to include: employing
political and public relations consultants; renting office space and
equipment; preparing and using letterhead stationery to correspond with
persons who displayed an interest in Askew’s potential campaign;
supplementing the salary of a personal secretary for additional
responsibility incurred during the testing-the-waters period; reimbursing the
Governor’s law firm for the activities of an associate attorney employed by
the firm who would have additional responsibility during the testing-thewaters period; reimbursing the Governor’s law firm for telephone costs,
copying costs, and other incidental expenses; preparing and printing a
biographical brochure and possibly photographs for use in connection with
speaking appearances (not for the general public); and soliciting
contributions for the limited purpose of engaging in such testing-the-waters
activities (not for the future campaign).88 Although this seemed to expand
dramatically permissible testing-the-waters activities, the FEC did warn
Askew that these activities must be solely for the purpose of determining
whether candidacy was viable.89
In Advisory Opinion 1982-03, the FEC again classified several activities
as falling within the testing-the-waters exemptions. Here, the FEC
approved Senator Alan Cranston’s plans to travel and speak to groups about
public issues, to hire “independent contractors in such fields as polling,
political consulting, public opinion, communications[,] or research,” to
compile and maintain information concerning persons who indicate interest
in Senator Cranston’s possible candidacy, and to organize advisory groups
on issues requiring expertise.90
Similarly, in Advisory Opinion 1985-40, the FEC ruled that a testing-thewaters fund established by former U.S. Senator Howard Baker Jr. could
send direct mail solicitations, as long as the mailings clearly indicated that
Baker had not yet determined whether he would seek the presidential
nomination, the funds raised would only be used for the purpose of testingthe-waters activities, and the solicitations did not result in amassing
campaign funds for use during candidacy.91
b. Triggering Candidate Status
FEC regulations provide the following nonexhaustive list as examples of
activities that indicate an individual has decided to become a candidate:
(1) The individual uses general public political advertising to publicize
his or her intention to campaign for Federal office. (2) The individual
raises funds in excess of what could reasonably be expected to be used for
88. Id. at 2–3.
89. Id. at 4–5.
90. FEC Advisory Opinion 1982-03 (Cranston), at 2, 4 (Mar. 15, 1982), http://saos.fec.
gov/aodocs/1982-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/P784-UQX3].
91. FEC Advisory Opinion 1985-40 (Republican Majority Fund), at 4 (Jan. 24, 1986)
[hereinafter AO 1985-40], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1985-40.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XTXAUAH].
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exploratory activities or undertakes activities designed to amass campaign
funds that would be spent after he or she becomes a candidate. (3) The
individual makes or authorizes written or oral statements that refer to him
or her as a candidate for a particular office. (4) The individual conducts
activities in close proximity to the election or over a protracted period of
time. (5) The individual has taken action to qualify for the ballot under
State law.92

The listed activities do not technically, in and of themselves, trigger
candidate status, but rather are tools used by the FEC to objectively analyze
whether an individual has decided to run for office.93 Even if the FEC
determines that such a decision has been made, candidate status is only
triggered if the individual has satisfied the $5000 contribution and
expenditure threshold.94
The first candidacy-triggering activity concerns general public political
advertising.95 This type of advertising “includes communications by
broadcast, satellite or cable, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising
facility, mass mailings, phone banks, and Internet communications.”96 In
Matter Under Review 6224, the FEC found that appearing at a cocktail
reception of a prominent businessman the day after the Republican state
convention and meeting with farmers and ranchers did not constitute
general public political advertising.97
The second candidacy-triggering activity concerns raising excessive
funds and amassing funds for use during candidacy.98 The FEC has never
ruled that an amount was in excess of what could reasonably be expected to
test the waters. In Matter Under Review 5934, the FEC ruled that raising

92. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131 (2015).
93. E.g., FEC Matter Under Review 6449 (Bruning et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis,
at 6 (2013) [hereinafter MUR 6449], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/13044331943.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AKJ7-VDDA].
94. FEC Matter Under Review 6650 (Citizens to Elect Soren Simonsen et al.), Factual
and Legal Analysis, at 3 (July 3, 2014), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044361946.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YQ48-J7BX]; see also FEC Matter Under Review 6736 (Art Halvorson et
al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 3 (Jan. 16, 2015), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/
15044370777.pdf (ruling that even though Halverson, the subject of the review, had engaged
in activities that exceeded the scope of those permitted under the testing-the-waters
exemption, he had not received contributions or made expenditures in excess of $5000 and,
thus, had not triggered candidate status) [https://perma.cc/PHD9-DNW5]; MUR 6819, supra
note 79, at 7 (ruling that Krulick, the subject of the review, did not trigger candidate status
through certain Facebook posts indicating he had already decided to run because he had not
yet reached the $5000 threshold). Even a voluntary filing of a statement of candidacy does
not trigger candidate status unless this $5000 threshold is met. 11 C.F.R. § 104.1.
95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
96. FEC Matter Under Review 6224 (Fiorina), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 9 (July 14,
2010) [hereinafter MUR 6224] (citing 2 U.S.C § 431(22) (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A.
§ 30101(22) (West 2015))), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/10044274140.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T4EX-WYDT]; accord 11 C.F.R. § 100.26.
97. MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 8–9. The FEC did note, however, that the lack of
evidence demonstrating that the subject of the review actually announced her intention to run
for the U.S. Senate and that the events were publicized through general public political
advertising were factors in their analysis. Id. at 9–10.
98. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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funds as high as $9,528,494 for testing the waters was not unreasonable.99
Additionally, in this matter, the First General Counsel’s Report suggested
that raising $9,528,494, but only spending $2,923,607, was indicative of
amassing campaign funds for candidacy; however, the FEC failed to rule as
such.100 In Matter Under Review 6224, the FEC ruled that hiring
consultants and low-level staffers to sell T-shirts and hats at a party
convention and collecting online donations was insufficient to demonstrate
amassing funds for eventual candidacy.101 In making this determination,
the FEC emphasized that the complainant failed to demonstrate that these
actions were for purposes other than testing the waters.102 On the other
hand, the FEC has ruled that soliciting funds for use against a specifically
named opponent does indicate the individual is amassing funds
impermissibly for candidacy.103
The third candidacy-triggering activity concerns “written or oral
statements that refer to [the individual] as a candidate for a particular
office.”104 For example, the FEC ruled that the Reverend Al Sharpton
became a candidate when, in chapter one of his book entitled “Mr.
President,” he wrote, among other things, “I am seeking the Presidency of
the United States in 2004.”105 Other phrases that have been found to trigger
candidate status include: “Would you help me serve you . . . as I now seek
the U.S. Senate?”;106 “‘I’m ready to run’ and ‘I can’t imagine any

99. Compare FEC Matter Under Review 5934 (Thompson), First General Counsel’s
Report, at 5 (Oct. 14, 2008) [hereinafter MUR 5934 First General Counsel’s Report],
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/10044272108.pdf (recommending that Senator Thompson
violated the law by raising excessive funds) [https://perma.cc/KF6S-N62H], with FEC
Matter Under Review 5934 (Thompson), Statement of Reasons, at 3 (Mar. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/
29044230161.pdf (dismissing the complaint) [https://perma.cc/4C75-Y3LS]. The FEC has
ruled other large sums were insufficient to move beyond what could reasonably be expected
for exploratory activities. See MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 6 (finding $611,799.25 was not
unreasonable).
100. Compare MUR 5934 First General Counsel’s Report, supra note 99, at 5 (suggesting
that raising $9,528,494, but only spending $2,923,607 was indicative of amassing funds for
candidacy), with MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 3 (dismissing the
complaint).
101. MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 6–7.
102. Id. at 7.
103. See MUR 6449, supra note 93, at 8 (finding Jon Bruning became a candidate by
sending an email soliciting funds to “defeat Ben Nelson in 2012”); FEC Matter Under
Review 5693 (Aronsohn et al.), General Counsel’s Report #2, at 9 (Nov. 7, 2007)
[hereinafter MUR 5693], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/28044205053.pdf (finding Paul
Aronsohn became a candidate by sending a solicitation letter stating every dollar received
could help “prepare for this fight against [incumbent] Scott Garrett”)
[https://perma.cc/WZT8-LHYL].
104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105. MUR 5363, supra note 83, at 4 (quoting AL SHARPTON & KAREN HUNTER, AL ON
AMERICA 4, 7 (Kensington 2002)).
106. FEC Matter Under Review 6735 (Sestak et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at 7
(July 18, 2014) (quoting Email from Joe Sestak (Aug. 27, 1013)), http://eqs.fec.gov/
eqsdocsMUR/14044364180.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7WW-E6GZ].
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conditions under which I would not run’”;107 and “[I am] ready to begin
fighting for our future . . . now. . . . [I] will immediately work for the
benefit of Colorado.”108 Additionally, if an individual or his advisors
inform the media that the individual will announce candidacy on a certain
date in the future, candidacy is triggered immediately, not on the official
announcement date.109 Lastly, once candidacy is triggered, subsequent
attempts to retract statements do not destroy candidate status.110
However, not every statement that refers to the individual as a candidate
triggers candidate status. The FEC generally analyzes the context in which
each statement was made. A statement that triggers candidate status
“requires some objective deliberateness, not a mere ‘slip up.’”111
Additionally, any statements must be authorized, as unauthorized
statements by the media that refer to an individual as a candidate are not
dispositive.112 Moreover, a statement’s audience and purpose are also
relevant. In Matter Under Review 6776, the FEC dismissed allegations
against a testing-the-waters candidate who created a proposal that referred
to him as a candidate several times, reasoning that the proposal was
“privately presented” to the National Republican Congressional Committee
to obtain their view on the feasibility of his candidacy.113
In addition to context, the FEC also analyzes the content of statements,
determining whether any statements at issue unambiguously refer to the
individual as a candidate.114 In Matter Under Review 5934, the FEC
examined several statements made by Senator Fred Thompson: “‘[I do not]
have any big announcement tonight,’ but ‘I plan on seeing a whole lot more
of you, how ‘bout that?’”;115 “‘[I am] testing the waters’ and ‘the waters
feel pretty warm to me’”; “[y]ou’re either running or not running . . . I think
the steps we’ve taken are pretty obvious”;116 and “‘[w]e are going to be
107. MUR 6449, supra note 93, at 7 (quoting Don Walton, Bruning Says He’s Actively
Exploring a Senate Campaign, LINCOLN J. STAR, (Nov. 5, 2010), http://journalstar.com/
news/local/govt-and-politics/bruning-says-he-s-actively-exploring-a-senatecampaign/article_88d3c204-e8f9-11df-805c-001cc4c002e0.html
[https://perma.cc/A66E8Y7E]).
108. MUR 5693, supra note 103, at 8–9 (omission in original) (emphasis added).
109. AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 6–7.
110. Id.
111. FEC Matter Under Review 5672 (Davis et al.) & 5733 (Davis et al.), Statement of
Reasons, at 3 (Mar. 13, 2007), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/00005C4A.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RVW7-JCCC].
112. MUR 6224, supra note 96, at 10.
113. FEC Matter Under Review 6776 (Niger Innis et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at
10 (Dec. 19, 2014), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/15044370340.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6A7V-HR99].
114. See MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 2–3.
115. MUR 5934 First General Counsel’s Report, supra note 99, at 7 (quoting Michael
Shear, Thompson Moves from ‘If’ He’ll Run to ‘How’, WASH. POST (July 2, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/01/AR2007070101
238.html [https://perma.cc/N9QR-65G9]).
116. MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 2 (quoting Erik Schelzig, Fred
Thompson Defends His Lobbying Past, WASH. POST (June 26, 2007, 5:41 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062601055_pf.
html [https://perma.cc/N3YZ-ULCQ]).
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getting in if we get in, and of course, we are in the testing the waters phase,’
adding, ‘we’re going to be making a statement shortly that will cure all of
that.’”117 The FEC found that although Senator Thompson “tested the
boundaries of the testing the waters exemption,”118 he did not trigger
candidate status because, unlike Al Sharpton, as discussed in Matter Under
Review 5363,119 Senator Thompson’s statements were ambiguous.120
Although according to FEC regulations, testing-the-waters activities
conducted in close proximity to an election or over a protracted period of
time may indicate the individual has decided to become a candidate, the
FEC has since weakened this provision’s determinativeness. The FEC has
explained that this factor is relevant,121 but that there is no maximum length
of time that automatically triggers candidate status.122
II. TESTING THE WATERS OR PREPARING FOR CANDIDACY?:
ANALYZING THE LEGALITY OF PRE-CANDIDACY COORDINATION
Despite the FEC’s attempts to clarify when candidacy is triggered
through regulations, advisory opinions, and matters under review,123 when
an individual becomes a candidate remains largely uncertain. Adding to
this ambiguity, it is also unclear how restrictions regulating Super PACs, all
of which refer only to a “candidate,”124 correlate with testing-the-waters
candidates. Part II.A discusses how, during the early stages of the 2016
presidential election, individuals used these ambiguities to strategically
circumvent campaign finance restrictions on coordination. Part II.B then
examines the FEC’s analysis of these issues in Advisory Opinion 2015-09
and the effects of that opinion.
A. Pre-Candidacy Coordination in Action:
Examples from the 2016 Presidential Election
During the preliminary stages of the 2016 presidential election, several—
then prospective, later official—candidates seemingly exploited the testingthe-waters phase by strategically avoiding candidate status. For example,
on January 6, 2015, two PACs that support Jeb Bush were formed: Right to
Rise PAC, a non-Super PAC, and Right to Rise Super PAC, a single-

117. Id. (quoting John King, Thompson: Roe ‘Bad Law and Bad Medicine’, CNN (Aug.
17, 2007, 10:53 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/08/18/thompson-on-runningwe%E2%80%99ll-be-in/comment-page-8/ [https://perma.cc/68KG-GZ9Z]).
118. Id.
119. See MUR 5363, supra note 83, at 4; supra note 105 and accompanying text.
120. MUR 5934 Statement of Reasons, supra note 99, at 2–3.
121. See AO 1981-32 supra note 80, at 5 (stating that time period has relevance, as had
Governor Askew engaged in certain activities over a protracted period of time, the length of
time would have diminished the activities’ usefulness in testing the waters and suggested
Governor Askew was trying to build a base of support).
122. E.g., AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 6.
123. See supra Part I.C.2.
124. See supra Part I.B.2.
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candidate Super PAC125 (later renamed and subsequently referred to in this
Note as “Right to Rise USA”).126 Bush did not officially file his statement
of candidacy with the FEC until June 15, 2015,127 more than six months
after initially announcing he was “actively explor[ing] the possibility” of
running for president.128 During this period, Jeb Bush traveled around the
country, speaking in front of crowds and headlining at least thirty-nine
Right to Rise USA fundraisers as the event’s “featured guest.”129 By June
30, 2015—two weeks after Bush officially declared—Right to Rise USA
had already raised over $103 million.130 Throughout this period, however,
other than one slip-up, Bush consistently maintained that he had not yet
made a decision to run.131
Mike Murphy, a top advisor during Jeb Bush’s 1998 and 2002
gubernatorial campaigns and someone Bush himself calls “a good
friend,”132 heads Right to Rise USA.133 On June 17, 2015—two days after
Bush filed his statement of candidacy—Buzzfeed reporters listened in on a
call between Murphy and a group of donors, in which Murphy admitted to
coordinating with the Bush campaign during Bush’s testing-the-waters
phase.134 Murphy stated he “[couldn’t] coordinate [with Jeb Bush’s
campaign] any more,” but added he was “well informed as of a week
ago.”135 Murphy then went on to describe campaign strategy, explaining

125. Robert Costa, Jeb Bush and His Allies Form Leadership PAC and Super PAC, Both
Dubbed Right to Rise, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2015/01/06/jeb-bush-forms-new-pac-right-to-rise/ [https://perma.cc/CL5F6MJ4].
126. See FEC Form 1, Statement of Organization, Right to Rise USA (June 12, 2015),
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/367/15951468367/15951468367.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HBE3CS6T].
127. FEC Form 2, Statement of Candidacy, Jeb Bush (June 15, 2015),
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/747/15031431747/15031431747.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2G7TL386].
128. Costa, supra note 125.
129. Michael C. Bender, Jeb Bush Tries to Win Without Speaking to His Favorite
Strategist, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/
articles/2015-06-26/does-anyone-believe-jeb-bush-isn-t-talking-to-his-super-pac-chief[https://perma.cc/U5TW-BC7R].
130. FEC Form 3X, Report of Receipts and Disbursements, Right to Rise USA, at 2 (July
31, 2015), http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/819/201507319000471819/201507319000471819.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9EB-98N6].
131. Eric Lichtblau & Nick Corasaniti, Jeb Bush, Taking His Time, Tests the Legal
Definition of Candidate, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/
us/politics/jeb-bush-taking-his-time-tests-the-legal-definition-of-candidate.html?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/8V4K-MSKF].
132. Bender, supra note 129.
133. Ed O’Keefe, Meet the People Who Will Try to Get Jeb Bush Elected President,
WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/
06/15/a-guide-to-jeb-bushs-family-friends-donors-staff-and-super-pac-friends/
[https://perma.cc/324S-8WP7].
134. Andrew Kaczynski & Ilan Ben-Meir, We Crashed Jeb Bush’s Super PAC’s Donor
Call, and Here’s What They Said, BUZZFEED (June 17, 2015, 6:53 PM),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/we-crashed-jeb-bushs-super-pacs-donor-calland-heres-what-th#.dnNonn24M0 [https://perma.cc/4MAH-66YC].
135. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mike Murphy).
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what Bush’s message would focus on as the presidential race continued.136
Murphy also credited Bush with creating part of the Super PAC’s strategy,
stating, “[O]ne of the new ideas that, you know, the governor had—he’s
such an innovator—is we’re going to be the first super PAC to really be
able to do just positive advertising.”137 Similarly, other sources reported
that Murphy was “deeply involved in Bush’s steps, courting donors,
selecting staff[,] and developing strategy.”138
Bush is not alone in participating in forming a single-candidate Super
PAC and sharing plans and strategies. For example, there is evidence that
John Kasich played a similar role with the Super PAC that supports him,
New Day for America. In April of 2015, Kasich helped form a 527
organization139 called New Day for America.140 Kasich did not file a
statement of candidacy with the FEC until July 23, 2015.141 That same day,
the 527 organization registered with the FEC and became a Super PAC.142
Prior to this split, Kasich reportedly played a significant role in determining
the Super PAC’s leadership and staff,143 as well as had substantial
discussions about long-term strategy with those who would go on to work
for the Super PAC.144 Kasich’s role in creating New Day for America is
136. Id. (“Murphy said Bush’s message would focus on three things: how to ‘make this
country an economic superpower again’; that Bush wants [to] ‘blow up the machine in
Washington’; and ‘the world is more chaotic than ever, we need an experienced president,
who’s had the life training to make our country safer, in a world that’s become more
unstable.’”).
137. Id. (quoting Mike Murphy). However, a spokesperson for Right to Rise USA later
said Murphy was referring to “Governor Bush’s historical preference for positive
advertising.” Matea Gold, It’s Bold, but Legal: How Campaigns and Their Super PAC
Backers Work Together, WASH. POST (July 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/here-are-the-secret-ways-super-pacs-and-campaigns-can-work-together/2015/07/06/
bda78210-1539-11e5-89f3-61410da94eb1_story.html [https://perma.cc/TA66-DMK6].
138. Thomas Beaumont, Jeb Bush Prepares to Give Traditional Campaign a Makeover,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 21, 2015, 6:19 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/409837aa09ee
405493ad64a94b8c2c3d/bush-preparing-delegate-many-campaign-tasks-super-pac
[https://perma.cc/G3ZD-ZRVQ].
139. A 527 organization is a group formed under section 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which is not registered with the FEC, but can raise and spend unlimited funds, as long
as such funds are used for issue advocacy rather than express advocacy. See Briffault, supra
note 8, at 1648; supra note 57 (defining express advocacy).
140. Kasich Forms New Political Organization As He Mulls 2016 Run, NBC NEWS (Apr.
20, 2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/kasich-forms-newpolitical-organization-he-mulls-2016-run-n345001 [https://perma.cc/W439-TADV].
141. FEC Form 2, Statement of Candidacy, John R. Kasich (July 23, 2015),
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/022/201507230300013022/201507230300013022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67Y8-QUDZ].
142. FEC Form 1, Statement of Organization, New Day for America (July 23, 2015),
http://docquery.fec.gov/pdf/003/201507230300013003/201507230300013003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DK8E-ZKKD].
143. See Mark Halperin, John Kasich’s Super-PAC Hires Fred Davis As Media
Strategist, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2015, 10:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/
articles/2015-06-10/exclusive-john-kasich-s-super-pac-hires-fred-davis-as-media-strategist
[https://perma.cc/6DRD-K7MY].
144. See Darrel Rowland, Super-PAC Rules Are Super-Vague, COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Oct. 5, 2015, 6:11 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/10/05/superpac-rules-are-super-vague.html [https://perma.cc/W95W-48GF].
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further evidenced by a video posted on New Day for America’s website
shortly after it became a Super PAC and Kasich filed his statement of
candidacy. In the video, Kasich alludes to the fact that he helped create the
Super PAC supporting him by stating “that’s why I’m announcing that we
created the New Day for America Committee . . . I hope you’ll visit our
website at NewDayforAmerica.com.”145
In addition to planning and strategizing, candidates also pushed the
boundaries of the testing-the-waters exemptions by having the Super PAC
that supports them film footage of them discussing their achievements and
qualifications for office during the testing-the-waters phase, for use in
creating communications after the individuals officially became candidates.
Filming this type of footage with a Super PAC during candidacy would
almost certainly be restricted under coordination regulations.146 Jeb Bush,
Carly Fiorina, John Kasich, and Scott Walker all filmed footage during the
testing-the-waters phase that was later used by the Super PACs supporting
them in advertisements after they filed their statements of candidacy.147
B. FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09
The media has been quick to highlight the actions of these thenprospective candidates, but did these individuals violate campaign finance
law? Jeb Bush and his lawyers maintain that Bush acted in compliance
with the law.148 Some campaign finance watchdog groups disagree,
however, and filed complaints with the FEC against several candidates and
urged the Department of Justice to take action.149 Then, on September 11,
145. See Complaint Against John R. Kasich Before the FEC, American Democracy Legal
Fund, at 8 (July 3, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint Against Kasich] (quoting John R. Kasich),
http://americandemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/Kasich-FEC-Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9X4-MGDD]; see also New Day for America, It’s Time for a New Day
for America, VIMEO (Apr. 2015), https://vimeo.com/125411715 [https://perma.cc/GYL6XC57].
146. It is highly unlikely that appearing in a communication would not satisfy the conduct
prong of the coordination regulations. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; infra note
280 and accompanying text.
147. Seth McLaughlin, Candidates’ Super PAC Footage Tests Spirit of Campaign
Finance Laws, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2015/sep/21/carly-fiorina-jeb-bush-john-kasich-super-pac-films/?page=allscott
[https://perma.cc/6BUK-WJV3]; Andrew Perez, Election 2016: Republican Candidates
Fiorina, Bush, Walker Filmed Ads with Super PACs Backing Their Campaigns, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2015, 4:34 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/election-2016-republicancandidates-fiorina-bush-walker-filmed-ads-super-pacs-backing-2098050 [https://perma.cc/
3C6U-8YMG].
148. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Campaign Finance Watchdogs Push Justice Dept. to
Investigate Jeb Bush’s PAC, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2015/05/27/campaign-finance-watchdogs-push-justice-dept-toinvestigate-jeb-bushs-pac/ [https://perma.cc/SGZ9-UD5S].
149. See Complaint Against Jeb Bush Before the FEC, American Democracy Legal Fund
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://americandemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/ADLF-Complaint-vsJeb-and-Jeb-Inc..pdf [https://perma.cc/38SR-8AJ7]; Complaint Against Kasich, supra note
145; Complaint Against Jeb Bush Before the FEC, Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21
(Mar.
31,
2015),
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/CLC%20%
20D21%20v.%20Jeb%20Bush_Complaint_3.31.15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4WZR-7CC7];
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2015, campaign finance lawyer Marc Elias filed an advisory opinion
request with the FEC on behalf of Senate Majority PAC (SMP) and House
Majority PAC (HMP)—two Democratic PACs—in the hopes that the FEC
would address some of these issues.150 Part II.B.1 gives an overview of the
questions Elias asked in his advisory opinion request. Part II.B.2 then
explores the FEC’s analysis of those questions by examining the different
draft advisory opinions issued prior to the final vote on the request. Lastly,
Part II.B.3 discusses the effect Advisory Opinion 2015-09 has on the
legality of the conduct described in the advisory opinion request.
1. Asking the Right Questions:
Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09
In Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09, Elias, on behalf of SMP and
HMP, asked twelve questions, four of which are relevant to this Note.
Question 7—by inquiring whether the conduct proposed in Question 1
would trigger candidacy—asks if candidacy is triggered when “an
individual, who would not otherwise be a candidate, participates in forming
a Super PAC (either directly or through agents), whose purpose is to
support the individual’s prospective candidacy,” once that Super PAC
raised more than $5000.151 Elias explains that such participation would
include appointing the Super PAC’s leadership, who would then raise funds
in unlimited amounts and spend such funds on independent expenditures in
support of the individual after he or she became a candidate.152
The other relevant questions concern noncandidates’ ability to coordinate
with the single-candidate Super PAC that will support them during
candidacy and how this could affect candidate status:
Question 2: If Senate Contender and House Contender, who would not
otherwise be candidates, share with the New Super PACs, SMP, and
HMP (either directly or through agents) information about their plans,
projects, activities, or needs, may the New Super PACs, SMP, and HMP
use that information to create public communications that satisfy the
“content prong” under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 and air after Senate Contender
and House Contender become candidates?153

Complaint Against Scott Walker Before the FEC, Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/CLC%20%20D21%
20v.%20Scott%20Walker_Complaint_3.31.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JFJ-HAF9].
150. See FEC Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 (Sept. 11, 2015) [hereinafter AOR
2015-09], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1320488.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y8N-E4JQ].
151. Id. at 4, 13. Question 7 is actually phrased in terms of whether the conduct
described in Question 1 would trigger candidate status. Id. at 13 (“Question 7: Would the
activities described in Question 1 trigger candidacy once the New Super PACs had raised
more than $5,000?”). Question 1 asks, “If an individual, who would not otherwise be a
candidate, participates in the formation of a Super PAC (either directly or through agents),
whose purpose is to support the individual’s prospective candidacy, is the Super PAC barred
from raising or spending soft money after the individual becomes a candidate?” Id. at 4.
However, a discussion of Question 1 is beyond the scope of this Note.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. at 6.
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The advisory opinion request adds further detail, stating that the
noncandidates will share information about whether the Super PAC should
sponsor positive or negative advertising and the campaign’s messaging and
scheduling plans.154 Furthermore, the advisory opinion request clarifies
this question, asking whether such pre-candidacy behavior would satisfy the
conduct prong under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d).155 Two other questions are
relevant to this Note:
Question 3: May SMP, HMP, and the New Super PACs film footage in a
studio of Senate Contender and House Contender, who would not then
otherwise be candidates, discussing their achievements, experiences, and
qualifications for office, and use that footage in public communications
that satisfy the “content prong” under 11 C.F.R. § 109.21?156
Question 10: Assuming that an individual has raised or spent more than
$5,000 on “testing-the-waters” activities, would the activity described in
Question 3 trigger candidacy?157

In response to the request, the FEC initially released two draft advisory
opinions—“Draft A” and “Draft B”—the only difference between the two
being the answer to two questions unrelated to this Note.158 The FEC also
received a joint comment from two of the watchdog groups that filed
complaints with the FEC,159 the Campaign Legal Center and Democracy
21.160 The FEC briefly discussed the advisory opinion request in an open
meeting on October 29, 2015 (with Elias present), but decided to push off a
vote until November 10th to allow the FEC time to release more draft
opinions and for interested parties to comment.161 Between the two
meetings, the FEC released four more draft opinions—“Draft C,” “Draft
D,”162 “Draft E,” and “Draft F”—and received comments from Elias (on
behalf of SMP and HMP)163 and Charles Spies (the lawyer who represents

154. Id.
155. Id.; see supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
156. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 7.
157. Id. at 16.
158. Compare Draft A, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 25–29 (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHY5-WNGU], with Draft B, FEC
Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 27–29 (Oct. 28, 2015), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/
201509_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS4U-KKTK].
159. See supra notes 145, 149.
160. See Comments from the Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21, Advisory
Opinion Request 2015-09 (Oct. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Comments from CLC & Democracy
21], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1322339.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW9C-VNU7].
161. Transcript of Record, FEC Open Meeting (Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript],
http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2015/documents/transcripts/Open_Meeting_Captions_2015_10_
29.txt [https://perma.cc/79FP-RP8V].
162. Draft D simply states that the questions are hypothetical, and thus, the FEC cannot
answer through their advisory opinion powers. See Draft D, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09,
at 7–19 (Nov. 5, 2015), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3NK86AJ].
163. See Comments from Marc E. Elias et al., Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 (Nov.
9, 2015) [hereinafter Comments from Elias], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1322574.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SZR9-3WP5].
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Right to Rise USA,164 but who was acting on his own behalf).165 Draft C,
the draft supported by the Republican commissioners,166 and Draft E, the
draft supported by two of the Democratic commissioners,167 are the two
drafts most relevant for analyzing the proposed questions. At the open
meeting on November 10, 2015, the FEC discussed the draft opinions and
passed Draft F by unanimous vote.168
2. Exploring Legality Under Existing Regulations
It is first important to establish that there are two different ways in which
these questions can be examined: (1) whether the existing coordination
regulations apply to the interactions between testing-the-waters candidates
and Super PACs, and (2) whether such interactions trigger candidate status,
simultaneously making coordination regulations applicable to those
individuals as candidates. Through analyzing FEC draft opinions and
comments by others, Part II.B.2.a examines whether existing coordination
regulations apply to testing-the-waters candidates, while Part II.B.2.b
examines whether such behavior is regulated through triggering candidacy.
Lastly, Part II.B.2.c discusses the jurisdictional issues surrounding the FEC
regulating noncandidates.
a. Unlawful Testing-the-Waters Coordination?
FEC coordination regulations do not mention individuals who are not
candidates, testing the waters or otherwise.169 Such regulations define
coordinated as “made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee,
or a political party committee.”170 Additionally, the conduct prong of the
coordinated communication regulation171 exclusively refers to conduct
between the creator of the communication and a candidate or a candidate’s
authorized committee.172 A plain reading of these regulations could lead to
the conclusion that such coordination regulations do not apply to
individuals prior to candidacy.173
164. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
165. See Comments from Charles R. Spies & James E. Tyrrell III, Advisory Opinions
Request 2015-09 (Nov. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Comments from Spies & Tyrrell],
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1322503.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3UT-2GCN].
166. See Certification, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09 (SMP and HMP), at 1 (Nov. 10,
2015) [hereinafter Certification], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/1323173.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C49M-3NJG].
167. See id. at 2.
168. See id. at 1.
169. 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20, 109.21 (2015).
170. Id. § 109.20(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the regulations governing
coordinated communications provide “[a] communication is coordinated with a
candidate . . . when the communication . . . .” Id. § 109.21(a) (emphasis added).
171. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
172. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d).
173. See Draft C, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 5 (Nov. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Draft
C], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9Y-CYGB].
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Draft C utilizes this same plain meaning analysis in answering Questions
2 and 3 in the affirmative, finding that the proposed Super PAC may use
information it receives about an individual’s plans, projects, activities, or
needs from that individual and may film the individual discussing their
achievements to create public communications after the individual becomes
a candidate.174 Draft C asserts that Elias’s inclusion of “an individual, who
would not otherwise be a candidate,”175 within the questions of Advisory
Opinion Request 2015-09, establishes that the individual is only
contemplating candidacy and, thus, cannot be a candidate.176 Draft C
asserts this despite subsequently receiving a comment from Elias stating
that such language does not establish that the individual is only
contemplating candidacy.177 Working based off of this assumption and
making no mention of the possibility of coordination restrictions applying
to testing-the-waters activities, Draft C simply states that coordination
regulations do not apply because the individuals in question are not
candidates.178
In his advisory opinion request, Elias makes a different argument,
asserting that “[t]he regulatory language does not exempt coordinating
conduct that takes place prior to individuals becoming candidates.”179
Furthermore, Elias argues that the policy underlying the coordination rules
does not support exempting pre-candidate coordination, stating it would be
inconsistent with the regulatory scheme and would allow individuals
contemplating candidacy to finance their activities with funds that do not
comply with federal restrictions.180 Lastly, Elias argues that because 11
C.F.R. § 100.2(l)—which requires presidential candidates to reimburse
certain pre-candidacy expenses paid for by multicandidate PACs during a
specified time period181—specifically incorporates the language of the
conduct standard of the coordinated communication regulations,182 the
“FEC intended to examine the conduct of individuals prior to their
becoming candidates in determining whether a contribution was made
during the individual’s pre-candidacy period.”183 Adding to Elias’s
argument, 11 C.F.R. § 9034.10, which requires presidential candidates who
accept federal funds to reimburse multicandidate PACs for certain precandidacy expenses, adopts this same language.184 “These provisions [11
174. See id. at 15.
175. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 12–14, 19.
177. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 6.
178. See Draft C, supra note 173, at 15.
179. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 7.
180. Id.
181. 11 C.F.R. § 110.2(l)(1)(i) (2015) (“The expenditure is made on or after January 1 of
the year immediately following the last Presidential election year . . . .”).
182. See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text.
183. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 7.
184. Compare 11 C.F.R. § 9034.10(a)(2) (“(a) A payment by a multicandidate political
committee is an in-kind contribution to, and qualified campaign expense by, a Presidential
candidate, even though made before the individual becomes a candidate . . . if . . . (2) With
respect to the goods or services involved, the candidate accepted or received them, requested
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C.F.R. §§ 100.2(l), 9034.10] were designed to address situations where
unauthorized political committees closely associated with a particular
individual planning to run for President defray costs that are properly
treated as in-kind contributions unless reimbursed by the Presidential
campaign.”185 This is arguably analogous to the conduct described in
Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09, where prospective candidates, through
coordination, would defray costs to single-candidate Super PACs that
should be treated as contributions. These provisions and the rationale
behind them could demonstrate that the FEC did intend for noncandidate
behavior to be included in determining whether a PAC made a coordinated
communication, but the regulations just have not been updated to reflect the
emergence of Super PACs.
Because Draft E frames the issues in terms of triggering candidate
status,186 it does not address whether coordination regulations apply to
testing-the-waters candidates,187 despite being urged to do so in a comment
submitted by Elias on behalf of SMP and HMP.188 Rather, Draft E only
states that the FEC “need not and does not address whether material
involvement in a communication by an individual before he or she becomes
a candidate might meet the conduct standards in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d).”189
b. Triggering Candidate Coordination Regulations?
These questions can also be examined by determining whether the
described conduct triggers candidate status, subjecting the individuals to
coordination regulations as candidates. Draft E analyzes the relevant
questions posed in Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 through this lens.
First, Draft E answers Question 7 by stating that an individual would
trigger candidate status by participating in the formation of a singlecandidate Super PAC whose purpose is to support that individual’s
candidacy.190 Draft E reasons that, because the proposed prospective
candidate will participate in the formation of the single-candidate Super
PAC whose stated purpose is to support the individual in candidacy,
appoint that Super PAC’s leadership, and (borrowing from Question 2)
share plans and activities used to create independent expenditures in
or suggested their provision, was materially involved in the decision to provide them, or was
involved in substantial discussions about their provision . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 11
C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1)–(3) (“(d) Any one of the following types of conduct satisfies the
conduct standard of this section . . . (1)(i) The communication is created, produced, or
distributed at the request or suggestion of a candidate . . . (2) A candidate . . . is materially
involved in decisions regarding [the communication] . . . (3) The communication is created,
produced, or distributed after one or more substantial discussions about the communication
[with] . . . the candidate . . . .” (emphasis added)).
185. Public Financing of Presidential Candidates and Nominating Conventions, 68 Fed.
Reg. 47,386, 47,407 (July 31, 2003) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 11 C.F.R.).
186. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
187. See Draft E, FEC Advisory Opinion 2015-09, at 19 n.10 (Nov. 6, 2015) [hereinafter
Draft E], http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/201509_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/6F39-LZ9R].
188. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 7.
189. Draft E, supra note 187, at 19 n.10.
190. Id. at 7.
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support of the individual after he becomes a candidate, the individual has
given consent to the Super PAC to receive contributions and make
expenditures on his behalf.191 Thus, Draft E argues, the proposed conduct
would trigger candidate status once the Super PAC raised more than $5000
because under FECA and FEC regulation, an individual meets the definition
of a candidate if another person or committee, who has obtained consent
from the individual to receive contributions or make expenditures on behalf
of such individual, receives contributions or makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $5000.192 In support of this conclusion, Draft E
cites FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-40, where the FEC concluded that a
steering committee organized by the requestor’s “political associates and
representatives” could trigger candidacy status if such committee engaged
in activities on behalf of the individual’s candidacy.193
This assertion arguably conflicts with Matter Under Review 6775, where
the FEC dismissed an allegation that Hillary Clinton had triggered
candidate status when her authorized committee from a past election (Ready
for Hillary) rented its mailing list to a Super PAC (Ready for Hillary PAC),
whose purpose was to encourage Hillary to run for office in 2016, and gave
that Super PAC permission to use the hillaryclinton.com URL.194 The
complaint alleged that
by conveying the mailing list to Ready for Hillary PAC and permitting it
to use the hillaryclinton.com URL, Clinton and Friends of Hillary were
acting “in furtherance” of Ready for Hillary PAC’s stated goals and
therefore, gave their consent for Ready for Hillary PAC to accept
contributions and make expenditures on Clinton’s behalf,195

triggering candidate status. However, the FEC did not find that Clinton
became a candidate.196 Draft E states that Advisory Opinion Request 201509 is distinguishable from Matter Under Review 6775 for four reasons.
First, Ready for Hillary PAC’s purpose was only to encourage Clinton to
run, not support her if she did. Second, Clinton and Ready for Hillary’s
activities were confined to evaluating potential candidacy. Third, there was
no evidence that renting the mailing list or Ready for Hillary’s other
activities were designed to amass funds for after Clinton became a
candidate. Finally, Clinton played no role in the formation of Ready for
Hillary PAC.197
Draft E further asserts that the prospective candidates’ active
participation in forming and operating a single-candidate Super PAC by
itself triggers candidate status because such conduct indicates that the

191. Id. at 7–8.
192. Id. (citing 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(2) (West 2015)); accord 11 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2015).
193. Draft E, supra note 187, at 8–9 (citing AO 1985-40, supra note 91, at 10).
194. FEC Matter Under Review 6775 (Ready for Hillary PAC et al.), Factual and Legal
Analysis, at 2–4 (Feb. 12, 2015) [hereinafter MUR 6775], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/
15044371447.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAH7-UZJN].
195. Id. at 5.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. (citing MUR 6775, supra note 194, at 7–8).
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individual has decided to become a candidate and is no longer merely
testing the waters.
Draft E reasons that “[b]ecause independent
expenditures, by definition, are made only after the individual becomes a
candidate, an individual’s formation of a [Super PAC] whose purpose is to
make such expenditures necessarily means that the individual would not be
forming the [Super PAC] merely” to determine the feasibility of
candidacy.198 Furthermore, Draft E asserts that any funds raised by the
Super PAC would be spent after he or she became a candidate, and
therefore, pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 100.72(b)(2),199 the individual would
trigger candidate status.200
Draft E, in answering Question 10, asserts that, assuming the prospective
candidate raised or spent more than $5000, the filming of a noncandidate
discussing their achievements and qualifications for office by a Super PAC,
for use in public communications supporting that noncandidate’s candidacy,
would trigger candidate status because such conduct would indicate that the
individual has decided to become a candidate.201 By quoting 11 C.F.R.
§§ 100.72(b) and 100.131(b), which provides that examples of candidate
triggering activities include “us[ing] general public political advertising to
publicize his or her intention to campaign for Federal office”202 and
“mak[ing] or authoriz[ing] written or oral statements that refer to him or her
as a candidate for a particular office,”203 Draft E implies that the conduct
described in Question 10 satisfies such regulations and, thus, triggers
candidate status.204
Although in discussing whether filming such footage would trigger
candidate status, Draft E cites Advisory Opinion 1981-32, it fails to provide
the relevant analysis. In this advisory opinion, as discussed in Part I.B.1,
the FEC approved fourteen activities proposed by Governor Askew.
However, the FEC expressed concern with respect to two relevant
activities:
3. Employment of a public relations consultant for the purpose of
arranging and coordinating speaking engagements, disseminating copies
of the Governor’s speeches, and arranging for the publication of articles
by the Governor in newspapers and periodicals.
13. Preparation and printing of a biographical brochure and possibly
photographs to be used in connection with speaking appearances by
Governor Askew.205

198. Id. at 11 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 100.72(a) (2015)).
199. Title 11, section 100.72(b)(2) of the C.F.R. provides that “amass[ing] campaign
funds that would be spent after he or she becomes a candidate” is an example of an activity
indicating that the individual as decided to become a candidate. 11 C.F.R. § 100.72(b)(2).
200. Draft E, supra note 187, at 11.
201. Id. at 15.
202. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72(b)(3), 100.131(b)(3).
203. Id. §§ 100.72(b)(4), 100.131(b)(4).
204. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 15.
205. AO 1981-32, supra note 80, at 2–3.
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The FEC explained that these activities “appear to project Governor Askew
to the public as a person qualified to be taken seriously as a presidential
contender, rather than as a means to ascertain if he would be so perceived
by the public.”206 The opinion continues by stating that if either activity
take[s] place in a factual context indicating that Governor Askew has
moved beyond the deliberative process of deciding to become a candidate,
and into the process of planning and scheduling public activities designed
to heighten his political appeal to the electorate, then it is the
Commission’s opinion that the activity would cease to be within the
exemption, and candidacy would arise.207

The proposed filming during the testing-the-waters phase is analogous to
the activities proposed in Advisory Opinion 1981-32, as they both involve
noncandidate involvement in the creation of media supporting them.
Unlike in Advisory Opinion 1981-32, however, given that the requestor
proposes to use the footage after the featured individual announces his
candidacy,208 candidate status is arguably triggered. Filming such footage
would seemingly demonstrate that the individual has moved beyond
deciding whether to become a candidate and into participating in activities
“designed to heighten his political appeal to the electorate.”209 Although an
in-depth analysis is missing from Draft E, the reasoning in Advisory
Opinion 1981-32 seems to inform Draft E, as the draft opinion frames its
answer to Question 10 in terms of whether the proposed filming would be
used to evaluate prospective candidacy or to create campaign advertising.210
That said, Matter Under Review 6533 is seemingly at odds with
Advisory Opinion 1981-32. In Matter Under Review 6533, the FEC
dismissed a complaint against an individual, finding he had not triggered
candidate status when videos that included references to him as a candidate
were uploaded to YouTube.211 The FEC reasoned that during the period at
issue, the videos were only available to a “small group” of individuals who
viewed the videos to “obtain their reaction and advice.”212 The FEC
concluded that “[u]nder these circumstances, the mere preparation, rather
than dissemination, of campaign materials in advance of a declaration of
candidacy does not by itself” trigger candidate status.213 Draft E
distinguished Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 from Matter Under
Review 6533 by asserting that there is no indication that the proposed
footage would be used for testing the waters (like obtaining reaction and

206. Id. at 4–5.
207. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
208. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 7.
209. AO 1981-32, supra note 80, at 5.
210. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 16.
211. FEC Matter Under Review 6533 (Perry Haney et al.), Factual and Legal Analysis, at
6 (Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter MUR 6533], http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/12044322928.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YQT6-VLAT].
212. Id. at 5.
213. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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advice of a small group); rather, the filming proposed in Advisory Opinion
Request 2015-09 would be used to promote the individual’s candidacy.214
Thus, in answering Question 3, Draft E concludes that the Super PAC
may not film the noncandidate and then use the footage in a public
communication because doing so would constitute a coordinated
communication and an unlawful contribution from the Super PAC.215 The
coordination analysis is much simpler once it is deemed that this conduct
triggers candidate status because coordination regulations, without question,
apply to candidates.216
Draft E implements this same candidacy triggering analysis in answering
Question 2, finding that a public communication created by a Super PAC
from information about a noncandidate’s plans and strategies, which is
aired after the noncandidate becomes a candidate, would be a coordinated
communication and an unlawful contribution because the individual would
be a candidate.217 However, in making this determination, Draft E reasons
that the individual would become a candidate by filming the footage, that is,
through the conduct proposed in Question 3, not by sharing strategies and
plans, as proposed in Question 2 (Questions 2 and 3 were answered
together).218 Draft E never directly addresses (granted the FEC was never
directly asked) whether candidate status is triggered when an individual
shares information about his plans, activities, or needs with a Super PAC
for subsequent use in creating a public communication after the individual
becomes a candidate.219 In reality, all Draft E states with regard to
Question 2 is that a communication created from information provided by
an individual who is a candidate (for some other reason) is a coordinated
communication under FEC regulations.220 This, in actuality, is just a
simple analysis of 11 C.F.R. § 109.21.221 Although Draft E potentially
alludes to this type of conduct triggering candidate status by mentioning it
as one of three factors in its analysis of Question 7222 (whether participating
214. Draft E, supra note 187, at 16.
215. Id. at 17. Draft E gives an analysis of how the proposed activity in Question 2
would satisfy the coordinated communication regulation in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21, including an
explanation of how the conduct would be “material involvement” under the conduct prong.
See id. at 18–19; see also supra note 66 (explaining the definition of material involvement).
216. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 17.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 16–17.
219. See id. at 17–20.
220. See id.
221. See supra Part I.B.2. Draft E gives an analysis of how the proposed activity in
Question 3 would satisfy the coordinated communication regulation in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21,
including an explanation of how the conduct would be a “substantial discussion” under the
conduct prong. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 18–19; see also supra note 67 (explaining the
definition of a substantial discussion).
222. See Draft E, supra note 187, at 8 (“Here, Requestors propose to have the prospective
candidates (1) participate in the formation of [Super PACs] whose stated purpose is to
‘support the individuals’ candidacies if they decide to run for office’ . . . (2) appoint the
[Super PAC’s] leadership . . . and (3) share . . . information about their strategic plans,
projects, activities, or needs’ and ‘campaign messaging and scheduling plans’ to enable the
Single-Candidate Committees ‘immediately’ to run communications after the prospective
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in forming a Super PAC triggers candidate status), this fact is not
dispositive, and thus, Draft E does not truly address whether the conduct
described in Question 2 would trigger candidacy.
As discussed in Part II.B.2.a, Draft C bases its conclusions on the
assumption that Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 presupposes the
individuals are not candidates. Draft C asserts that when the individual’s
state of mind is unknown, an objective analysis is conducted; however,
Draft C concludes that, because the advisory opinion request includes “an
individual, who would not otherwise be a candidate”223 within its questions,
it is actually known that the individual is only contemplating candidacy,
and thus, an objective candidacy triggering analysis is unwarranted.224 That
said, Draft C does not completely foreclose on the possibility of the conduct
described in Questions 1 and 3 triggering candidate status. Draft C suggests
that
if the prospective candidates’ states of mind were unknown . . . [a]n
individual’s active participation in the formation and operation of the
contemplated [Super PACs], the sole purpose of which is to support that
individual’s federal candidacy, or in the filming of video intended to be
used to promote that individual’s federal candidacy, could evidence225

that a decision to seek office has been made.226 However, Draft C then
displays skepticism toward this statement by quoting Matter Under Review
6533,227 where the FEC found that “the mere preparation, rather than
dissemination, of campaign materials in advance of a declaration of
candidacy” did not trigger candidacy.228
c. Jurisdictional Issues
During the first open meeting discussing Advisory Opinion Request
2015-09, FEC Commissioner Lee Goodman raised concerns that the FEC
did not have jurisdiction over an individual’s activities before he or she
becomes a candidate.229 Commissioner Goodman characterized the FEC’s
jurisdiction over individuals testing the waters as “retroactive
jurisdiction . . . we only assert . . . if you become a candidate later.”230
Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub, however, disagreed with this
characterization, stating that “the testing the waters regulations do not
extend the statute retroactively backwards . . . where we otherwise wouldn’t
have jurisdiction,” but rather the regulations are “an exemption to what
would otherwise be absolutely considered under the statute to be candidate
candidates become candidates, including ‘independent expenditures in support of’ the
candidates . . . .” (emphasis added)).
223. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 4, 6–7 (emphasis added).
224. Draft C, supra note 173, at 12–13.
225. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See MUR 6533, supra note 211, at 6.
229. See Transcript, supra note 161.
230. Id.
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activities” to allow “candidates a little bit of opportunity to . . . see if they
could raise money for a viable candidacy.”231 Later, Charles Spies
submitted a comment echoing Commissioner Goodman’s jurisdictional
concerns.232
The jurisdictional issues raised by Commissioner Goodman and Spies
stem from two circuit court cases. In FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan
Political League233 and FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Committee,234 the D.C.
and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, held that the FEC lacked jurisdiction
over draft groups—groups created to encourage an individual to run for
office—because draft groups’ activities are not related in any way to a
person who had decided to become a candidate.235
Elias, on the other hand, submitted a comment arguing that the FEC does
have jurisdiction. He asserted that “for thirty years, the [FEC’s] jurisdiction
over individuals ‘testing-the-waters’ for candidacy by imposing limits and
source restrictions on the funds that can be used to pay for such activities
has been unquestioned.”236 He then contended that no court case has
successfully challenged the FEC’s jurisdiction already in existence, nor has
any court suggested that the holding in Machinists Non-Partisan Political
League applies to testing-the-waters candidates.237 Building on Elias’s
point, the FEC has seemingly asserted unchallenged jurisdiction over
testing-the-waters candidates in 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72, 100.131, 110.2(l), and
9034.10. Furthermore, 11 C.F.R §§ 110.2(l) and 9034.10 assert jurisdiction
not through certain behavior triggering candidate status; rather, the
provisions act as a reach-back for certain expenditures made before
candidacy to be considered contributions if and when candidacy is
triggered.238

231. Id.
232. Comments from Spies & Tyrrell, supra note 165, at 1 (“We echo Commissioner
Goodman’s stated concerns about the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over an
individual, or a group supporting an individual, prior to his or her becoming a candidate.”).
233. 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
234. 681 F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982).
235. Fla. for Kennedy Comm., 681 F.2d at 1287 (“[The draft committee] can be subject to
the FEC’s jurisdiction only if Senator Kennedy was a candidate during the period of [the
draft committee’s] activities.”); Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d at 395–
96.
236. Comments from Elias, supra note 163, at 7.
237. Id.
238. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l), 9034.10 (2015); Public Financing of Presidential
Candidates and Nominating Conventions, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,386, 47,407 (July 31, 2003)
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 11 C.F.R.) (“The covered expenses in the new
rules at 11 CFR 110.2(l) and 9034.10 would not trigger candidacy themselves, but would
count as contributions in-kind and/or qualified campaign expenses if and when the individual
benefiting becomes a candidate.”). However, these regulations provide a cure if the
candidate reimburses the multicandidate PAC within thirty days of becoming a candidate. 11
C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l), 9034.10.
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3. Not Getting the Answers:
Effects of a Deadlocked Advisory Opinion
An advisory opinion requires a majority vote of four or more
commissioners to be passed.239 FEC advisory opinions may be relied on by
the advisory opinion requester and any person or group involved in
activities which are “indistinguishable in all its material aspects with
respect” to the activities described in such advisory opinion.240 Any person
or group who satisfies this requirement and, in good faith, relies on an
advisory opinion obtains a safe harbor against sanctions.241 That said,
advisory opinions include a disclaimer that requestors may not rely on an
advisory opinion if there is a change in facts material to the advisory
opinion’s conclusions or subsequent developments in the law contravene
the opinion.242
On November 10, 2015, the FEC voted on the draft opinions for
Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09.243 The commissioners voted on Draft
C and Draft E, but both failed to obtain a majority.244 Ultimately, after
some minor, unrelated amendments, the FEC passed Draft F by unanimous
vote;245 however, Draft F does not answer any of the discussed questions,
but rather simply states that “[t]he Commission could not approve a
response to the remaining questions by the required four affirmative
votes.”246 This failure to obtain a majority is unsurprising, as the structure
of the FEC—comprised of three Republican commissioners and three
Democrat commissioners—makes the commission prone to deadlock.247
That said, the effects of deadlocked FEC advisory opinions—both when
the FEC refuses to answer the questions or is completely deadlocked and
fails to pass any opinion—are unclear. The FEC has not directly addressed
this issue and few courts have weighed in. The courts that have weighed in
have held that a deadlocked advisory opinion does not act as a safe harbor
239. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c) (2012) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30106(c) (West 2015)).
240. Id. § 437f(c)(1) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30108(c)(1)); 11 C.F.R. § 112.5.
241. 2 U.S.C. § 437f(c)(1)(2) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30108(c)(1)(2)) (providing
that such individuals or groups shall not be subject to any sanction provided by “this Act or
by chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26”); 11 C.F.R. § 112.5.
242. See, e.g., AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 9. Subsequent developments in the law
include, but are not limited to, statutes, regulations, advisory opinions, and case law. Id.
243. Certification, supra note 166, at 1.
244. Id. at 1–2. Draft C failed by a vote of three-to-three, and Draft E failed by a vote of
two-to-four. Id.
245. Id. at 1–3.
246. AO 2015-09, supra note 23, at 9.
247. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DEADLOCKED VOTES AMONG
MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC): OVERVIEW AND POTENTIAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 8 (2009), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/08/CRS-2009-FEC-Votes.pdf (finding every deadlock studied
involved party-line votes) [https://perma.cc/R74N-9DYU]. Even FEC Commissioner Lee
Goodman admits that “Congress set [the FEC] up to gridlock.” Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C. Can’t
Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-election-abusecommission-chief-says.html?login=email&_r=0&mtrref=undefined&assetType=nyt_now
[https://perma.cc/U6A5-345U].
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from enforcement.248 In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.
FEC,249 the D.C. Circuit held that a deadlocked FEC advisory opinion did
not prevent the FEC from enforcing its rules at any time.250 After a
deadlocked advisory opinion, the requestor or any person who intends on
engaging in indistinguishable conduct may seek a declaratory judgment
from a court to enjoin the FEC from bringing an enforcement proceeding
against it in the future.251 In Hispanic Leadership Fund, Inc. v. FEC,252
when deciding whether to grant a declaratory judgment, the Eastern District
Court of Virginia held that the deadlocked FEC advisory opinion warranted
neither Skidmore nor Chevron deference, as there was no basis for giving
deference to one draft opinion over another, leaving the court to decide the
case for itself.253 Citing this decision, then-FEC Vice Chair Ann Ravel and
FEC Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub argued in a written statement that
“[t]he failure to issue an advisory opinion results in ‘no ruling,
interpretation, nor opinion of the agency,’”254 leaving the requestor and
others intending to engage in indistinguishable behavior in essentially the
same position they were in before submitting the advisory opinion
request.255
On the other hand, others argue that a deadlocked advisory opinion is
“nearly as good as a win.”256 Many argue that a deadlocked advisory
opinion, in actuality, acts as a de facto license or green light to proceed with
the proposed activity, as the requestor or other persons can be confident that
the FEC will be unable to obtain the majority required for bringing an
enforcement proceeding.257 This confidence is arguably not unfounded, as
248. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Hispanic Leadership Fund, Inc. v. FEC, 897 F. Supp. 2d 407, 419 (E.D. Va. 2012).
249. 69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
250. Id. at 603. In holding that the FEC theoretically still could obtain a majority and
exercise its enforcement powers, the court acknowledged that there was no immediate
danger of enforcement because the FEC had already deadlocked on the issue. Id. Still, the
court cited a change of mind or replacement of a commissioner as possible ways in which a
majority vote might occur after a deadlock. Id.
251. Kristy Eagan, Note, Dark Money Rises: Federal and State Attempts to Rein in
Undisclosed Campaign-Related Spending, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801, 844 (2012); see
Hispanic Leadership Fund, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
252. 897 F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D. Va. 2012).
253. Id. at 428.
254. Statement on Judicial Review of Deadlocked Commission Votes, FEC Vice Chair
Ann M. Ravel and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub 4 (June 17, 2014) (quoting Hispanic
Leadership Fund, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 428), http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044354045.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EQH9-HV96].
255. See id.
256. Anthony Herman, The FEC: Where a “Tie” Can Be (Almost) a “Win”, INSIDE POL.
L. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2014/03/20/the-fec-where-a-tie-canbe-almost-a-win/ [https://perma.cc/GNX3-EE7C].
257. Michael M. Franz, The Federal Election Commission As Regulator: The Changing
Evaluations of Advisory Opinions, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 735, 763 (2013) (“Conflict and
deadlocks send a signal that the law can be skirted, and with little likelihood of penalty after
the fact.”); Nicholas Confessore, Democrats Lay Groundwork to Expand Use of ‘Super
PACs’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/us/politics/
democrats-seek-to-expand-use-of-super-pacs.html
(“Should
the
commission
deadlock[,] . . . ‘most of the aggressive lawyers will say it gives them a green light’ to
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even Ann Ravel, who was then the FEC Chairwoman, admitted that the
FEC is “worse than dysfunctional,” and “[t]he likelihood of the laws being
enforced is slim.”258 Additionally, some criticize Hispanic Leadership
Fund and Chamber of Commerce, arguing that, even if the FEC could
somehow reach a majority, “basic notions of fairness would almost
certainly stand in the way of a Commission” bringing an enforcement
proceeding, especially against the requestor.259
Elias (and SMP and HMP) will likely interpret the FEC’s indecision in
Advisory Opinion 2015-09 as a de facto license to proceed with the
proposed activities. From the very beginning, Elias wrote in his advisory
opinion request that, although he had “serious doubts about the
permissibility of many of the activities[,] . . . the PACs cannot cede
strategic advantage to their political competitors.”260 The Campaign Legal
Center and Democracy 21 even accused Elias of submitting his advisory
opinion request for the purpose of obtaining a deadlocked opinion that he
could use as de facto authorization.261 Nevertheless, in a concurring
opinion, Commissioner Weintraub issued a warning to those who might
interpret the deadlocked advisory opinion as de facto approval. She stated
that there was more agreement within the FEC about prospective
candidates’ involvement in Super PACs triggering candidate status than one
might think and that “political actors and the practitioners who counsel
them would be well-advised to take notice and act accordingly.”262
Commissioner Weintraub’s warning aside—as even she admitted that she
knows better than to predict how her warnings would play out in an
enforcement context263—it seems as though the deadlocked advisory
opinion did very little to clear up whether the testing-the-waters
candidate/Super PAC interactions described in the advisory opinion request
trigger candidate status or constitute illegal coordination. Even if Advisory
Opinion 2015-09 has no effect on the legal status of the behavior—and in
theory, the FEC could still conduct an enforcement proceeding—political
actors will likely bet on the FEC’s inability to obtain a majority and treat
the advisory opinion as de facto authorization. Thus, the ultimate result of

engage in similar tactics.”) [https://perma.cc/EM2J-YQ2Y]; Herman, supra note 256 (“All
but the most risk adverse parties should be comfortable treating the failure to obtain an
advisory opinion . . . as a license to go forward with the activity . . . . [T]he requestor can
virtually rest assured that the conduct . . . will not be the subject of an enforcement
proceeding . . . .”).
258. Lichtblau, supra note 247. For a humorous look at the FEC’s dysfunction, see The
Federal Election Commission: An Enormously Dysfunctional Agency (Comedy Central
television broadcast Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/t2knjp/the-daily-showwith-trevor-noah-the-federal-election-commission--an-enormously-dysfunctional-agency
[https://perma.cc/RPY9-D9EY].
259. Herman, supra note 256.
260. AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 4.
261. Comments from CLC & Democracy 21, supra note 160, at 1.
262. Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub Concurring in Part, FEC Advisory
Opinion 2015-09 (SMP and HMP), at 2 (Nov. 13, 2015), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/
1322762.pdf [https://perma.cc/HW99-327N].
263. Id.
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Advisory Opinion 2015-09 is that the legal status of the described
conduct—including both the questions of candidate status and precandidacy coordination—is largely unclear under current regulations.
III. DEBATING THE NEED FOR FURTHER REGULATION
With political actors likely to interpret Advisory Opinion 2015-09 as de
facto authorization, the question of whether steps should be taken to restrict
individuals’ pre-candidacy involvement with Super PACs emerges. This
part explores the differing views on the constitutionality and desirability of
restricting pre-candidacy coordination, with Part III.A focusing on those
opposing such restrictions and Part III.B focusing on those supporting them.
A. First Amendment Defenders
Any restriction in campaign finance must strike the proper balance
between protecting the First Amendment and preventing corruption.264
Opponents of regulating testing-the-waters candidates’ involvement with
Super PACs would argue that any such limit would impermissibly burden
the First Amendment.265 Opponents would assert that restrictions on such
behavior could not be narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption
or the appearance thereof, as required by the Supreme Court.266 Although
the Court held that groups and individuals’ interactions with candidates
present a sufficient danger of corruption, opponents would contend that the
Court did not recognize this threat of corruption in noncandidates.267
Additionally, opponents would argue that current FEC regulations
sufficiently guard against corruption, as individuals cannot coordinate with
Super PACs once they become candidates, which is when such individuals
would actually benefit from Super PAC expenditures.268
Furthermore, opponents would assert that, by narrowing the justifications
sufficient to restrict First Amendment rights, the Citizens United Court
expanded First Amendment protections of political speech and heightened
the rigor required to prove sufficient corruption.269 Opponents would
contend that even if the Court found that noncandidate behavior could
potentially present the narrow form of corruption required, limitations on
testing-the-waters candidates’ interactions with Super PACs could not be
sustained. Such regulations, opponents would argue, would be overly
inclusive, essentially giving the FEC authority to regulate the daily
264. See supra Part I.A.
265. Comments from Spies & Tyrrell, supra note 165, at 1–2. In his comment, Spies
criticized regulating testing-the-waters candidates’ interactions with Super PACs, arguing
that Citizens United made it clear that “political speech must prevail against laws that would
suppress it by design or inadvertence.” Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
312 (2010)).
266. See supra Part I.A. Spies criticized Draft A (which eventually became Draft E) as
being “hardly narrowly tailored, and . . . not serv[ing] any compelling government interest.”
Comments from Spies & Tyrrell, supra note 165, at 1.
267. See supra Part I.A.
268. See supra Part I.B.1.
269. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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activities and relationships of any individual and restrict indispensable
political speech.270 This, they would assert, would be an unsustainable
burden on the First Amendment and contravene the Court’s expansive
protections of political speech.271 Furthermore, in his comment to the FEC,
Charles Spies argued that such regulations would have unintended
consequences on other organizations, such as extending testing-the-waters
restrictions to apply to noncandidates’ interactions with other groups, such
as nonprofit corporations.272 These arguments echo those made by
opponents of broad coordination regulations, who assert that such
regulations impermissibly interfere with normal political communications
and lead to overenforcement.273
Opponents also would likely raise the jurisdictional issues discussed in
Part II.B.1.d. Lastly, opponents would assert that increasing restrictions on
testing-the-waters activities would contradict the purpose of the testing-thewaters exemptions, which were created so as to not discourage individuals
from pursuing a variety of activities to determine if candidacy is viable.274
Further regulating testing-the-waters candidates, opponents would contend,
would discourage individuals from considering candidacy, as they would
want to avoid accidentally or unknowingly subjecting themselves to
regulations with potentially harsh penalties.
B. Corruption and Ensuring Independence
On the other hand, proponents of regulating testing-the-waters
candidates’ interactions with Super PACs would argue that such regulations
are essential for preventing the type of corruption articulated by the
Proponents would assert that an individual’s
Supreme Court.275
participation in forming a Super PAC that will support him, sharing plans
and strategy for candidacy, and coordinating to create public
communications presents exactly the type of danger of quid quo pro or
appearance of quid pro quo corruption the Court described.276 In fact,
proponents would contend, this is clearly demonstrated by current FEC
270. See Robert F. Bauer, The Right to “Do Politics” and Not Just to Speak: Thinking
About the Constitutional Protections for Political Action, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
67, 72–76 (2013) (explaining arguments against strict coordination regulations in general).
271. See supra Part I.A.
272. Comments from Spies & Tyrrell, supra note 165, at 1–2. In making this assertion,
Spies references the Clinton Foundation, which perhaps could lead to the conclusion that this
argument is more of a jab from Spies, who represents Jeb Bush’s Super PAC, directed at
Elias, who represents Hillary Clinton, instead of an actual concern. See id.; Maggie
Haberman, Clinton Hires Campaign Lawyer Ahead of Likely Run, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/03/04/clinton-hires-campaignlawyer-ahead-of-likely-run/ (explaining Elias represents Hillary Clinton) [https://perma.cc/
H2HY-UBJ6].
273. Bauer, supra note 270, at 72.
274. See AO 1981-32, supra note 80, at 4.
275. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining that the prevention of quid pro
corruption or the appearance thereof is the only legitimate justification for campaign finance
limits).
276. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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regulations, which limit how a candidate may engage in these exact
activities.277 Such regulations restrict Super PAC expenditures created
from a substantial discussion with a candidate, which is defined in FEC
regulations as receiving information about such candidate’s campaign
plans, projects, activities, or needs.278 Additionally, such regulations
restrict a candidate’s ability to appear in Super PAC advertisements.279
According to the FEC, such conduct makes it highly implausible that the
candidate was not materially involved with its creation,280 which is
restricted by FEC regulation.281 Proponents would argue that these very
same dangers of corruption are not alleviated merely because the
individuals have taken care not to trigger candidate status.282
Additionally, proponents would assert that allowing such pre-candidacy
involvement with Super PACs threatens the requirement that Super PACs
only make expenditures that are independent. Proponents would argue that
Citizens United and SpeechNow.org emphasized the noncoordinated nature
of independent expenditures, which quells concerns of corruption.283 As
the District Court for the District of Columbia put it, “[T]here can be little
doubt that the independence of independent expenditures is the lynchpin
that holds together the principle that no limits can be placed on
contributions for such expenditures,” and without such independence, “the
doctrine carefully crafted in Citizens United and SpeechNow would begin to
tumble back to Earth.”284 In differentiating between coordinated and
independent expenditures, the Supreme Court characterized independent
expenditures as those that are “truly,”285 “wholly,”286 or “totally”287
independent.288 Proponents would argue that failing to regulate precandidacy involvement in Super PACs that will support that individual in
candidacy allows Super PACs to disguise coordinated expenditures as
independent expenditures. This, proponents would assert, enables Super
277. See supra Part I.B.2; see also Draft E, supra note 187, at 18–19 (explaining how
Questions 2 and 3 in Advisory Opinion Request 2015-09 satisfy the coordination regulation
in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21).
278. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
279. FEC Advisory Opinion 2003-25 (Weinzapfel for Mayor Committee), at 6 (Oct. 17,
2003), http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2003-25.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8J2-BKTS].
280. Id. But see 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(g) (2015) (creating a safe harbor for certain public
communications where the candidate merely endorses other candidates or solicits funds for
other persons).
281. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
282. See AOR 2015-09, supra note 150, at 7 (arguing that the policy underlying the
coordination rules does not support exempting pre-candidate coordination, as it would be
inconsistent with the regulatory scheme and would allow individuals contemplating
candidacy to finance their activities with funds that do not comply with federal restrictions).
283. See Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38
(D.D.C. 2012).
284. Id.
285. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
286. Id.
287. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
288. Paul S. Ryan, Two Faulty Assumptions of Citizens United and How to Limit the
Damage, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 585 (2013).
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PACs to evade contribution and expenditure limits and continue to reap the
benefits of being a Super PAC,289 even though the PAC is no longer an
independent expenditure-only committee.
Proponents would argue that the true independence of Super PAC
expenditures is essential for the functionality of campaign finance law in a
post-Citizens United political and regulatory landscape.290 Although Super
PACs would not be able to coordinate with individuals after the individual
became a candidate, this restriction, proponents would argue, is insufficient
to maintain true independence. Proponents would reason that Super PACs
would already have all the information needed to operate in a coordinated
manner and make expenditures, rendering any subsequent coordination
unnecessary and, ultimately, existing coordination regulations
ineffective.291 These arguments mirror those made by proponents of
stricter coordination regulations, who argue that existing coordination
regulations undermine the Supreme Court’s emphasis on true independence
and do not effectively guard against corruption.292 Proponents of further
testing-the-waters regulations, like their counterparts arguing for stricter
coordination restrictions, would assert that current FEC regulations “are
based on an older model of independent committee—in which the
committee had independent existence long before the current election; had a
set of political, ideological, and policy goals in addition to the election of a
specific candidate” and was not “functionally tied to the candidate.”293
IV. UPDATING THE OUTDATED:
PROPOSING NEW REGULATIONS
New regulations should be adopted to restrict testing-the-waters
candidates’ interaction with Super PACs that will support them in
candidacy. The failure of regulators to update regulations adequately in
response to rapid changes in campaign finance post-Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org294 has resulted in individuals subverting campaign finance
restrictions.295 The exploitation of these antiquated regulations has
undermined the key facet of Citizens United that allows for Super PACs to
exist: the independence of an independent expenditure.296 With the
politically divided FEC likely to remain stagnant,297 individuals will
289. See supra Part I.B.
290. See Stop This Insanity, Inc. Emp. Leadership Fund v. FEC, 902 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38
(D.D.C. 2012); Working Together, supra note 45, at 1497–98.
291. See supra Part II.A.
292. See Ryan, supra note 288, at 585; Working Together, supra note 45, at 1497–98;
Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, Symposium, Campaign Finance: Remedies Beyond the
Court, DEM. J. (2013), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/27/campaign-finance-remedies
-beyond-the-court/ [https://perma.cc/AW87-RQ4Y].
293. Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 92
(2013) (arguing for stricter coordination regulations).
294. See supra Part I.A–B.
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continue to delay candidacy to exploit impermissibly the testing-the-waters
phase to prepare for candidacy in an otherwise unlawful manner. These
individuals will continue to create Super PACs run by people of their
choosing that are equipped with plans, strategies, and content to make socalled “independent” expenditures not subject to the spending, fundraising,
or source restrictions that nearly identical expenditures would be subject
to.298
New regulations are necessary not to combat Citizens United, but rather
to ensure that the regulatory scheme in place effectively enforces that
decision. Although the FEC will likely still face enforcement issues even
with new regulations, adopting clear and comprehensive regulations will
help facilitate better enforcement and act as a strong deterrent against such
conduct. This part proposes two sets of regulations designed to restrict this
conduct, both of which should be adopted by the FEC. Part IV.A discusses
the first proposal, which revises the coordination regulations. Part IV.B
discusses the second proposal, which updates the testing-the-waters
regulations concerning triggering candidacy.
A. Proposal #1:
Curbing Testing-the-Waters Coordination
To incorporate pre-candidacy coordination into existing coordination
regulations, the FEC should adopt the following regulation:
For the purposes of 11 CFR 109.21(d)(1) through (d)(3), “candidate”
shall include an individual who satisfies all of the following:
(1) The individual engaged in conduct, while not yet a candidate
under 11 CFR 100.3, that would otherwise satisfy 11 CFR
109.21(d)(1), (d)(2), or (d)(3), but for the individual not being a
candidate under 11 CFR 100.3;
(2) Subsequent to the conduct described in subsection (1), the
individual became a candidate under 11 CFR 100.3;
(3) The conduct described in subsection (1) occurred on or after
January 1 of the year immediately following the last election for
the Federal office in which such individual subsequently became
a candidate under 11 CFR 100.3; and
(4) The individual is:
(ii) The clearly identified candidate in a communication that
satisfies 11 CFR 109.21(c); or
(iii) The opponent of the clearly identified candidate in a
communication that satisfies 11 CFR 109.21(c).299
This regulation would essentially add a reach-back period to three
subparts of the conduct prong in FEC coordination regulation 11 C.F.R.
298. See supra notes 52–54.
299. The author of this Note created this proposed regulation.
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§ 109.21 by incorporating certain noncandidates into the definition of
candidates for the purpose of those subparts.300 The regulation would only
apply when the candidate would otherwise have satisfied 11 C.F.R.
§§ 109.21(d)(1), (d)(2), or (d)(3) but for the fact that the conduct—(d)(1)
the request or suggestion; (d)(2) the material involvement; or (d)(3) the
substantial discussion—occurred when he or she was not yet a candidate.
In other words, this regulation would expand the coordination regulations to
instances where the coordination occurred while the individual was not a
candidate and that individual subsequently reaped the benefits of a
communication during candidacy, which, in reality, was coordinated, but
was not subject to the limitations normally placed on such expenditures.
Thus, this regulation would prevent individuals and Super PACs from
exploiting pre-candidacy to circumvent coordination regulations and help
ensure the independence of independent expenditures.
This proposed regulation avoids several of the criticisms described in
Part III.A. First, the proposed regulation is not overly broad, as it only
encompasses conduct during a specified period of time. This time period—
starting on or after January 1st of the year of the last election for the
specific office in which the individual eventually runs—only targets a
portion of the time between elections, the period of time in which
individuals are most likely to be preparing for candidacy. Additionally, the
language of the regulation provides for the time period to differ depending
on which federal election is at issue.
Similarly, the proposed regulation is not overly broad because it would
apply to only individuals who actually become candidates and benefit from
a coordinated expenditure that satisfies existing regulations. Thus, the
proposed regulation would not expand the types of activities covered by
coordination regulations nor be overly encompassing by regulating those
who never become candidates. This combats the related criticisms of a lack
of jurisdiction,301 as the proposed regulation would only regulate
candidates’ noncandidate conduct, not assert jurisdiction over
noncandidates.
This regulation is also consistent with current FEC regulations: 11
C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l) and 9034.10 assert similar reach-back jurisdiction over
pre-candidacy interactions with multicandidate PACs302 and provide for the
same applicable time period.303 Additionally, 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.2(l) and
9034.10 were adopted to combat similar conduct, as they “were designed to
address situations where unauthorized political committees closely
associated with a particular individual planning to run for [office] defray
costs that are properly treated as in-kind contributions.”304

300.
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303.
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See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
See supra note 181.
See supra note 185.
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B. Proposal #2:
Triggering Candidacy
The FEC should also update the existing testing-the-waters regulations
concerning triggering candidate status. Providing for noncandidates’
involvement with Super PACs to trigger candidate status would further
prevent evasion of campaign finance law. Such behavior would trigger all
regulations applicable to candidates, including those beyond restrictions on
This section proposes three candidacy-triggering
coordination.305
regulations. Part IV.B.1 proposes two regulations that add certain conduct
to the existing list of activities that trigger candidacy. Part IV.B.2 proposes
a regulation that would create a rebuttable presumption of candidacy for
certain other conduct.
1. Adding to the List
The FEC should adopt the following two regulations as subparts (b)(6)
and (b)(7), respectively, of 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.72 and 100.131. These new
subparts would add to the nonexhaustive list of “activities that indicate an
individual has decided to become a candidate”306:
(6) The individual, either directly or through his or her agents,
participates in the formation of an independent expenditure-only
political action committee (“Super PAC”) whose purpose is, in
whole or in part, to support that individual during candidacy.
This participation includes, but is not limited to, appointing that
Super PAC’s leadership.
(7) The individual, either directly or through his or her agents, shares
plans, strategies, projects, activities, or needs for candidacy with
a Super PAC whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to support
that individual during candidacy.307
These additions would not change the structure or enforcement of the
existing testing-the-waters regulations.308 Thus, the regulations would not
raise jurisdictional issues, but rather would only update the existing
regulations to reflect changes in campaign finance that have occurred with
the rise of Super PACs. These regulations are necessary because the
regulation proposed in Part IV.A would only apply in instances where the
noncandidate’s conduct led to the creation of a communication.
These regulations strike a balance between being over- and
underinclusive. To trigger candidate status, the testing-the-waters candidate
must engage in the listed conduct with a Super PAC whose purpose is to
support that candidate during candidacy. This potentially could provide an

305.
306.
307.
308.

See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra note 92.
The author of this Note created these proposed regulations.
See supra Part I.C.
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avenue for circumvention, as Super PACs could avoid revealing that their
purpose is to support a particular candidate until after the individual
otherwise becomes a candidate. That said, if the FEC brought an
enforcement proceeding after the individual otherwise became a
candidate—for example, through a formal declaration of candidacy—
support by such Super PAC after this formal announcement would be
strong evidence that the Super PAC’s purpose was to support that
individual’s candidacy when the conduct in question initially occurred.
Additionally, the regulation proposed in Part IV.A would guard against
total circumvention. Even if an individual avoided triggering candidate
status, the reach-back period proposed in that regulation could potentially
incorporate such pre-candidacy conduct into the coordinated expenditure
restrictions. Despite these potential issues, this qualifier is necessary.
Without it, the regulation would be overinclusive, as it could potentially
apply to all individuals’ interactions with any Super PAC. It also is
necessary to ensure the proposed regulations are consistent with current
FEC regulations, which emphasize that only actions targeted toward
candidacy trigger candidate status.309
On the other hand, the regulations avoid being underinclusive by
applying only to a Super PAC whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to
support such individual’s candidacy. This prevents Super PACs from
circumventing the regulations by simply supporting more than one
candidate. Additionally, this extra restriction is important because the
danger of corruption is present regardless of whether the Super PAC is a
single-candidate Super PAC or supports more than one candidate.
2. The Rebuttable Presumption
The FEC should adopt the following regulation as subpart (c) of 11
C.F.R. §§ 100.72 and 100.131:
(c) An individual’s participation in the planning or production of a
communication, of the kind described in 11 CFR 109.21(c), with
an independent expenditure-only political action committee
(“Super PAC”) whose purpose is, in whole or in part, to support
that individual during candidacy, in a manner that satisfies 11
CFR 109.21(d)(1), (d)(2), or (d)(3), creates a rebuttable
presumption that the individual has become a candidate. In the
context of enforcement, an expenditure for such communication
by the Super PAC, in satisfaction of 11 CFR 109.21, after the
individual makes a formal announcement of candidacy or files a
statement of candidacy with the FEC, is strong evidence that the
individual became a candidate when he or she participated in the
planning or production of such communication.310

309. See supra Part I.C.2.b.
310. The author of this Note created this proposed regulation.
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This regulation would create a rebuttable presumption of candidacy in
instances where an individual participated in the planning or production of a
communication of the type listed in the content prong of the coordination
regulation311 and in a manner described in the conduct prong of the
coordination regulation312 with a Super PAC whose purpose is to support
such individual’s candidacy. Thus, for example, the filming of a
prospective candidate by a Super PAC whose purpose is to support that
individual’s candidacy would create a rebuttable presumption of candidacy.
In an enforcement proceeding, the individual could then provide evidence
that he had not yet decided to become a candidate and that his participation
in the planning or production of such communication was not geared
toward his candidacy.
Because the new regulation would encompass a broad variety of conduct,
the proposed regulation would only create a rebuttable presumption of
candidacy. Under this presumption, candidacy would be easier to dispel, as
compared to the regulations proposed in Part IV.B.1 and 11 C.F.R.
§§ 100.72 and 100.131. That said, the proposed regulation provides that, if
such Super PAC makes an expenditure in satisfaction of the coordinated
communication regulations313 after the individual otherwise becomes a
candidate, the presumption becomes more difficult to rebut. This provision
ensures enforcement in the most obvious cases of coordination.
Furthermore, the requirement that the Super PAC’s purpose must be, in
whole or in part, to support that individual during candidacy provides the
same balance of inclusiveness as the regulations proposed in Part IV.B.1.
Additionally, although this regulation does not simply add to an existing list
like the regulations proposed in Part IV.B.1, there are no jurisdictional
issues because this proposal regulates testing-the-waters candidates in the
same manner as existing regulations.
Lastly, it is important to note how this proposed regulation relates to the
coordination regulation proposed in Part IV.A. Technically, an individual
who satisfies the regulation proposed in Part I.A also would satisfy the
proposed regulation in this section. Triggering candidate status would
essentially preempt the need for the regulation proposed in Part IV.A, as
existing coordination regulations would apply to that individual as a
candidate. Nevertheless, the regulation proposed in this section would be
more encompassing. Unlike the regulation proposed in Part IV.A, the
described conduct could have legal significance before the airing of a
communication and triggering candidate status would subject an individual
to regulations beyond coordination restrictions.314 Additionally, although
satisfying the proposed regulation in Part IV.A would be strong evidence
that candidacy was triggered when the individual engaged in the conduct,
doing so still would create only a rebuttable presumption under the
regulation proposed in this section. Thus, adopting both sets of regulations
311.
312.
313.
314.
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See supra Part I.B.2.
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would give the FEC multiple tools to combat pre-candidacy coordination.
The two regulations, however, also could be alternatives for the FEC to
choose from when considering adopting new regulations. While perhaps
more difficult to enforce, the regulation proposed in this section would have
more legal consequences; on the other hand, while easier to enforce, the
regulation proposed in Part IV.A only would regulate coordination.
CONCLUSION
The current campaign finance regulatory system fails to adequately
address the post-Citizens United political realities. The failure of regulators
to revise regulations to keep pace with the rapid developments in campaign
finance has allowed political actors to exploit these outdated regulations.
By abusing the testing-the-waters phase to prepare for candidacy in an
otherwise unlawful manner, candidates have undermined the Supreme
Court’s holding Citizens United and transformed independent expenditureonly committees into coordinated campaign machines. Adopting the
proposed regulations will help align the regulatory system with the spirit of
Citizens United and better equip the FEC with the tools to operate in the
modern campaign finance and political landscape.

